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Abstract 
in 
A stable money demand function and exogeneity of prices is at the core of planning and 
implementing a monetary policy of monetary targets. This thesis examines both the stability of 
M2 money demand and price exogeneity in Rwanda for the years 1980 to 2000. We estimate 
and test the elasticities of the determinants of Rwandan money demand function. We include 
in this demand function those variables which economic theory indicates must be part of any 
empirical investigation of money demand. All coefficients had the signs as required by 
economic theory. We estimate the money demand function for Rwanda using cointegration 
analysis and an error correction mechanism. The results show real income, prices and M2 to 
be cointegrated. We employ three tests to show that the estimated demand function for 
Rwanda is stable. We then test the second requirement for coherence in monetary aggregate 
targeting that money determines prices. The results show that prices are exogenous to money. 
But before we can definitely conclude that an inflation targeting regime is feasible from 
monetary policy perspective, we point out that future research on this important topic must 
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The key issue of this study is the quest for a stable money demand in Rwanda. An econometric 
relationship is stable if the parameters in such a relation are not subject to permanent changes 
over time (Hoffman et ah, 1995). A stable money demand is among the indispensable 
preconditions for the formulation and conduct of monetary policy (Sriram, 1999). In fact, what 
is being sought in a stable money demand function is a set of necessary conditions for money 
to exert a predictable influence on the economy so that the central bank's control of the money 
supply can be a useful instrument of economic policy (Judd and Scadding, 1982). Because of 
the importance of stability, a steady stream of theoretical and empirical research has been 
conducted worldwide over the past several decades. Much of the research concerned 
developed countries, especially in the US and UK. Relatively fewer studies were carried out in 
the developing countries, but the number of studies has been increasing in recent years. In 
industrial countries, the quest for a stable money demand function is in most cases supported 
by extensive data sets and a detailed knowledge of institutional settings. The converse, 
however, is observed in developing countries where sometimes the relevant data is rare and 
the knowledge of the performance of the economy is poor. 
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The stability of money demand has been a longstanding issue (Goldfeld, 1976). However, 
despite intensive analytical and empirical efforts, there is no general consensus concerning the 
stability (or instability) of the money demand function (Andersen, 1985). Up to the 1970's the 
money demand function was considered to be the one of the most stable and reliable in 
economics. Khan (1974), Laumas and Mehra (1976) and Laumas (1978) all found stable 
money demand relationships. In contrast to these studies, Friedman and Kuttner (1992) and 
Miyao (1996) have argued against a stable US money demand. Shifts in the demand for 
money were also found in other industrial countries in the 1970's, while results are mixed for 
developing countries (Sriram, 1999). Studies of the M3 money demand in South Africa by 
Casteleijn (1999), Moll (1999), Moll (2000), and Van den Heever (2001) assert that the 
relation between money, income and prices has become less stable in recent years. However, 
Nell (2003) provides empirical evidence of a constant and structurally stable M3 money 
demand function for South Africa over the period 1968-1997. According to Judd and Scadding 
(1992) possible causes of money demand instability after the 1970's are changes to the 
structure of the financial system allowing for greater role for interest rates and economizing on 
money balances. Many other causes of the increasing instability of money demand have been 
pointed out such as: (i) the fact that different studies cover different countries at different time 
periods, and (ii) the various specifications of the money demand function differ from study to 
study. 
In 2000 the South African Reserve Bank adopted an inflation targeting framework and one of 
the underlying reasons for the change in the monetary policy strategy was based on the view 
that a stable money demand relation has become increasingly difficult to identify in South 
Africa (Casteleijn, 1999; Van den Heever, 2001). In recent years many countries such as New 
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Zealand, Canada, the UK, Sweden, Finland, Spain and Australia have adopted an inflation 
targeting strategy. A number of circumstances and considerations led to this change. In the 
1970's, Western countries experienced a period of stagflation - higher rates of inflation 
without higher growth - and skepticism about the benefits of expansionary monetary policies 
began. Keynesian policy prescriptions were called into question. Neoclassical economists 
managed to formalize reasons for the skepticism about Keynesian policy. One of the early 
arguments uses the expectations augmented Phillips curve, often associated with Milton 
Friedman. They argue that there was a short-run tradeoff only between the unemployment rate 
and the deviation of the inflation rate from its expected level. But there was no long-run 
tradeoff between unemployment and inflation. Hence, monetary policy had a very limited 
ability to change the unemployment rate (Handa, 2000: 257). This view was later emphasized 
by the Modern Classical School - with rational expectations and neutrality of money as its 
core elements for policy analysis - and advocates that monetary authorities could not induce 
systematic errors in price expectations and could not bring about the deviation of employment 
from its equilibrium level. In the 1980's, this theoretical revision about the neutrality of money 
had the impact of persuading the central banks in western countries to abandon a multiplicity 
of goals in favor of a sole focus on controlling the rate of inflation. It is worth noting that the 
goal of price stability is not meant to be an end in itself. It is followed in the belief that price 
stability fosters growth, so that a low target rate for inflation is meant to provide conditions 
that produce long-run growth of output and lower long-run unemployment for an economy. As 
Bernanke et al. (1999: 3) asserts, "one element of the new consensus is that low, stable 
inflation is important for market-driven growth." The target of price stability is also meant to 
remove or minimize the potential of monetary policy to destabilize economy. It will clearly 
not remove all the fluctuations from the economy, since fluctuations could still arise from 
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supply shocks. But it is believed that a stable price and financial environment is still the best 
format for the economy to respond to such shocks. 
As part of these developments, in 1998, the Rwandan monetary authority was advised by its 
economic partners - the IMF and World Bank - to consider a medium term inflation target of 
three per cent a year. The National Bank of Rwanda utilizes the M2 monetary aggregate as an 
intermediate objective, with the monetary base as its operational instrument. In contrast to a 
policy of inflation targeting, a monetary policy of monetary aggregate targeting requires first 
that there is a stable money demand function and, second, that changes in money determine 
price changes. 
In this study, we follow Nell (2003) and investigate whether both requirements are satisfied. 
We estimate the long-run money demand equation in Rwanda, using the modern approach of 
cointegration analysis. The study also utilizes the Error Correction Mechanism (ECM) to 
estimate the short-run money demand in Rwanda. Finally, we utilize relevant tools to test for 
stability of money demand in Rwanda, and assess the super exogeneity of income and prices 
before drawing conclusions and policy implications. If income and prices are super 
exogenous, then money changes do not determine price changes and the second requirement 
for a workable monetary aggregate targeting policy is not met. 
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1.2 Key questions and research hypotheses 
In order to assess whether such a policy change to inflation targeting is feasible, this thesis 
attempts to determine whether both requirements (stability and money changes depending on 
price changes) for remaining with money aggregate targeting are met. In 1990, Rwanda started 
the implementation of the structural adjustment facilities under the auspices of the IMF and 
the World Bank. In 1998, Rwanda began a policy of inflation targeting as required by the 
Bretton-Woods institutions. These events led us to formulate the research questions underlying 
our research as follows: 
(i) Is there a stable money demand function in Rwanda so that monetary aggregate 
targeting can continue to play a role in the macro economy? 
(ii) Does money determine prices? 
Based on theses questions, our study will seek to confirm both the following hypotheses: 
(i) The demand for money function in Rwanda is stable. 
(ii) Causation runs from money to prices. 
Both these need to be satisfied if money aggregates are to be targeted by a central bank. 
1.3 Objectives and chapter outline 
If we can affirm both hypotheses, then we can question the wisdom of the National Bank of 
Rwanda to adopt the inflation targeting strategy. Thus the main objective of this study is to 
provide an assessment of the inflation targeting strategy in Rwanda. In order to achieve this 
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objective, we adopt the following structure. Chapter Two devotes itself to the presentation of 
the theory of the demand for money, and the analysis in the chapter aims to substantiate the 
specification of the money demand function we use in the empirical chapter of this paper. 
Chapter Three presents an overview of the evolution of monetary policy in Rwanda and 
highlights its important features. The main focus in Chapter Four concerns the quest of 
investigating the stability of money demand in Rwanda and finding out whether prices are 
dependent on the money supply. We conclude in Chapter Five by summarizing the main 
empirical results as well as their policy implications. We find some support for inflation 
targeting. 
Before proceeding with the theoretical and policy chapters prior to our empirical investigation 
in Chapter Four, we are of the view that some insight can be gained from presenting some 
summary statistics of the data used in this thesis. This has the added benefit of forcing a hard 
look at the data in order to ensure that no anomalies are present. 
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Table 1.1 presents summary statistics and other features of data used in this thesis. All the data 
is in logarithms. Some interesting features of this data are: 
(i) The change in M2 follows closely the sum of the changes in real GDP and the CPI. 
(ii) The variance of real GDP is the highest, no doubt reflecting measurement 
problems. The genocide also plays a role in this variability. The genocide no doubt 
is the cause of the bimodal shape in the first two variables, 
(iii) The real income variable has a long left tail. The price data has a long right tail. 
The observed symmetry in the money supply data adds weight to the notion that 
changes in prices and real income match the changes in the money supply. 
Table 1.2 Summary statistics for interest rate spread 

















(Symmetry is rejected) 
Trimodal 
Table 1.2 presents the same information like Table 1.1 but only for our interest rate variable (a 
spread between a long-term market rate and a short-term deposit rate) which is not in 
logarithms. This data comes from fairly symmetrical distribution and unlike our other data is 
unimodal. Given that after 1995 interest rates were more market oriented it is not surprising 
that we measure a high variance in the interest rate spread. This variance is more marked when 
we consider the real (spread less the expected, taken as next year's, inflation rate) interest rate 
spread. The effect of the genocide in 1994 is to pull the real rate spread below zero making the 
distribution asymmetrical as prices start to change dramatically. The variance of the inflation 
rate is high and is hidden in Table 1.1 as the second variable is the logarithm of the CPI and 
not the inflation rate. 
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Rwanda has had a long and tumultuous history. The tragedy of the genocide in 1994 is an 
event possibly beyond our means to understand or contemplate. Some questions as to why and 
how such an event could occur are important. Very important. However, does that mean all 
other questions concerning Rwanda are trivial? In a very real sense the answer to this question 
about questions is yes. Despite this affirmative answer, we proceed with this study of money 
in Rwanda, recognizing that conclusions here pale in insignificance when considering other 
far more important issues. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THEORIES OF MONEY DEMAND 
2.1 Introduction and chapter outline 
Money is said to be at the heart of economic activities. De Grauwe (1989) argues that the 
development of modern economies would not have been possible without money. Basically, 
money serves four major functions: medium of exchange, store of value, unit of account, and 
source of deferred payments (Sriram, 1999). This chapter is devoted to the presentation of 
some of the theories on the demand for money, and the analysis aims to provide a theoretical 
underpinning for the specification of money demand used in the empirical chapter of this 
thesis. The economy's demand for money is the quantity of money (cash and balances in bank 
accounts) that people collectively want to hold on average (Kennedy, 2000). Mankiw (1999) 
postulates that a money demand function is a relationship that shows what determines the 
quantity of real money balances people wish to hold at any point in time. Money demand 
theories have evolved over time. There is a broad range of money demand theories 
emphasizing utility considerations and Keynes' three motives of holding money: transactions, 
precautionary and speculative. However, this diverse spectrum of money demand theories 
shares some common and important variables. They generally put forward a relationship 
between the quantity of money demanded and a set of a few important economic variables 
linking money to the real sector of the economy (Judd and Scadding, 1982: 993). What 
distinguishes these theories from each other, however, is that although they consider similar 
determinants of the demand for money, they frequently differ in the specific role assigned to 
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each variable (Boorman, 1976: 35). The following is how we opted to organize this chapter. 
Section 2.2 briefly traces the main theoretical contributions of economists on money demand 
beginning with the classical economists and ending with some more recent developments. 
Section 2.3 covers the Money in the Utility Function (MIUF) approach, which treats money 
like any other good. The next section considers the indirect utility approach where real money 
balances make possible efficient use of the resource time. Section 2.5 presents the insertion of 
Money into the Production Function (MIPF) approach by considering real balances as an input 
into the firm's production function just like other economic inputs. Money is also presented as 
an indirect argument of the firm's production function in Section 2.6. Section 2.7 deals with 
the derivation of the demand for real balances in the Walrasian general equilibrium model. 
The latter forms the foundation for a micro-economic analysis of markets in the economy and 
the determination of prices of goods. The Walrasian model also forms the basis of modern 
classical and neoclassical macroeconomic models, and the standard against which Keynesian 
macroeconomics sets out its differences (Handa, 2000). Section 2.8 simplifies the real 
balances demand function derived in the Walrasian perspective (in Section 2.7) for adaptation 
to macroeconomic analysis. From Section 2.9 through Section 2.11 we present the various 
money demand models that focus on each of Keynes' three motives for holding money. In 
addition we outline both Baumol's (1952) and Tobin's (1956) model of money demand. We 
then synthesize all the theoretical material, in Section 2.12, in order to provide a justification 
for the money demand function that we estimate in Chapter Four. Section 2.13 summarizes 
and concludes. 
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2.2 Theoretical contributions of researchers on money demand 
It has been observed that money demand theories evolved over time. This section briefly 
reviews theoretical studies on the demand for money, tracing the contributions of researchers 
beginning with the classical economists and ending with some of the more recent works in the 
area of money demand. Classical economists formulated their theories of money demand by 
referring to the functions that money serves: (i) a medium of exchange, (ii) a store of value, 
(iii) a unit of account, and (iv) a means of deferred payment. 
Classical economists assume that the market for each good clears, so that the economy is 
always at full employment except for transitory deviations; and prices are flexible to ensure 
that equilibrium is attained. In such an economy, money is a medium of exchange, and is 
given the role of numeraire; that is, a numbering device that is used to express prices and 
values of various goods, but whose own value remains unaffected by this role (Sriram, 1999). 
According to the classical theory, money is neutral and does not influence aggregate real 
income, real interest rates or the determination of relative prices. Walras' analysis of money 
demand as part of his general theory of economic equilibrium is considered the basis of the 
modern theory of money demand (Schumpeter, 1954: 1082). Fisher (1911) formulated the 
famous quantity theory, which led the way to Pigou's (1917) analysis of money holdings. 
The quantity theory has a rich and varied tradition. It posits a proportional relationship 
between the quantity of money and the price level. The quantity theory is the proposition that 
a change in the money supply in the economy causes a proportionate change in the price level 
13 
(Handa, 2000). The quantity theory was developed in the classical framework in two 
equivalent versions. One version is associated with Fisher and is called the equation of 
exchange, and another version is termed the cash balances or Cambridge approach and is 
associated with Cambridge economists like Pigou. The equation of exchange associated with 
Fisher (1911) is: MsVT = PrT in which the quantity of money in circulation Ms is related to 
the volume of transactions T and the price level of goods traded PT through VT {the velocity 
of circulation) which represents the rate at which money turns over in meeting expenditures. 
Schumpeter (1954) points out that, treating Ms as exogenous and holding VT and T constant 
allows the equilibrium price level to move in direct proportion with the quantity of money. 
The cash balances approach, associated with Pigou (1917) and Marshall (1923), examines the 
determination of prices from the perspective of demand and supply. In this approach money is 
held not only as a medium of exchange as in Fisher's case, but also as a store of value. Pigou 
(1917) provides the familiar quantity formulation as MV = Py, which relates the quantity of 
money M and the income velocity of circulation V to the nominal level of income Py. 
Therefore, given that real income y is at full employment level and assuming VXo be stable, an 
increase in the quantity of money M results in a proportional increase in the price level P. 
Hence, money is neutral; that is, it only affects nominal variables but not real ones (Sriram, 
1999). 
Monetarists reinterpret the quantity theory as representing an economy's demand for money, 
so that they were able to structure an explanation as to how an increase in the money supply 
caused an increase in economic activity. The result of their analysis is termed the modern 
quantity theory of money in which the original quantity equation is specified as M = (Uv)PQ. 
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The latter is considered a behavioural equation that reflects the economy's demand for money, 
so that as nominal income, PQ, increases, the demand for money increases (Kennedy, 2000). 
Neoclassical economists emphasize the store of value function of money and consider the 
medium of exchange function as the primary role of money. They also postulated various 
other factors affecting the demand for money. Cannan (1921) advocates a negative 
relationship between money demand and anticipated inflation, which was later recognized by 
Marshall (1926), as well as MacCallum and Goodfriend (1987). A shortcoming of neoclassical 
approach is that there is no explicit role given to the interest rate in determining the demand 
for money in their writings (Sriram, 1999). 
It is Keynes (1930 and 1936) who provides a more rigorous and convincing analysis of the 
importance of the interest rate variable affecting money demand. Keynes analyses money 
demand in a different way to that of his predecessors, by focusing on the motives for holding 
money. He postulates that money demand arises from three motives: transactions, 
precautionary and speculative. He advocates that the transactions demand for money arises 
from a need to finance current transactions, and that the transactions' demand for money 
depends on the level of income. He theorizes that the precautionary motive is due to 
uncertainty about future payments, that is, sudden expenditures and unforeseen opportunities 
for advantageous purchases. The speculative motive for holding money which Keynes called 
liquidity preference is considered his main contribution to money demand theory. This motive 
arises from an individual's desire to secure profit by knowing better than the market what the 
future will bring forth (Keynes, 1936). With the speculative motive for holding money, 
Keynes emphasizes the store of value function and focuses on the future yield on bonds. 
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Therefore, Keynes formally introduces the interest rate in the money demand function which 
he specify as md = f(y,i), in which the demand for real money balances md depends 
positively on real income y and negatively on the interest rate, i. Keynes postulates that when 
the interest rate is very low, people expect it to rise and prefer to hold whatever money is 
supplied. Thus, the aggregate demand for money becomes perfectly elastic with respect to the 
interest rate, leading the economy to get into a situation called the liquidity trap (Sriram, 
1999). 
Based on Keynes writings, post-Keynesian researchers have produced a broad range of 
theories emphasizing the transactions', the speculative, the precautionary and liquidity motives 
for holding money. Transactions or inventory models (Baumol, 1952, and Tobin, 1956) stem 
from the medium of exchange function, whereas the store of value function leads to asset or 
portfolio models. In the rest of the chapter we present various formal derivations of the money 
demand function involving theories of money demand from Keynes' three motives for holding 
cash balances to more recent contributions with a view to justifying the model we use in our 
empirical chapter. 
2.3 Money In the Utility Function (MIUF) 
One general approach of the nineteenth century and dominant at present, advocates that the 
demand for money should be analysed as that of a choice of one good among many other 
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goods. In this case, money demand is analyzed under the consumer demand theory approach , 
in which individuals hold goods because they derive utility from them (Friedman, 1956; 
Barnett, 1980). We begin by defining what is meant by a good. The analysis of the behaviour 
of households, defines a good "as something of which an individual desires more rather than 
less, or less rather than more, ceteris paribus'" (Handa, 2000: 55). For Rutherford (1995) a 
good is an output, which bestows utility on the person possessing it. Macroeconomic analysis 
generally considers four categories of goods: commodities or products, labor or its counterpart 
leisure, and money and bonds. Compared to commodities, labor and bonds, money has the 
characteristic of being the most liquid, meaning it is that good which can be easily converted 
into the others. 
Indeed, money cannot be consumed, however an adequate reason for considering money as a 
good in the utility function is the fact that people desire to hold real balances for exchanges 
against goods other than money. Hence, the dominant monetary approach at present claims 
that the utility maximization framework used to determine the demand for commodities in 
general, should be applied to the determination of the demand for real balances by an 
individual or a firm (Handa, 2000). 
To introduce money into the utility function, Handa (2000) considers money's liquidity 
services. The greater the quantity of real money balances held by an individual, the greater is 
that individual's liquidity. Friedman (1956) argues that the demand for money (assets) should 
be based on axioms of consumer choice. To make the analysis more rigorous we examine the 
1 This approach is often associated with the Chicago School which considers the demand for money as a direct 
extension of the conventional theory of demand for any durable good (see Feige and Pearce, 1977). 
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underlying assumptions of money in the utility function. Regarding any rational individual, 
utility theory in microeconomics has the following axioms: 
(i) If the individual prefers a bundle of goods A to another bundle B, then he will 
always choose A over B. This means that rational individual's preferences are 
consistent. 
(ii) If the individual prefers A to B and B to a third bundle of goods C, then he prefers 
A to C; which means that rational individual's preferences are transitive. To these 
axioms, monetary theory formulates a third one concerning real balances which 
Handa states as follows: 
(iii) "In the case of financial goods, including money, which are not used directly in 
consumption or production but are held for exchange for other goods in the present 
or the future, the individual is concerned with the former's exchange value into 
commodities - that is, their real purchasing power over commodities and not with 
their nominal quantity" (Handa, 2000: 57). 
The first axiom, which is about individual rationality, and the second concerning the 
transitivity of preferences ensures that preferences can be ranked and represented by a utility 
function. Hence, the inclusion of money - and other financial assets - directly in the utility 
function can be justified on the grounds that the utility function expresses preferences and that 
since more is preferred to less, they should be included in the utility function just like other 





where xk is the quantity of the k'
h commodity (k = 1,..., K), n is the labor supplied in hours 
and mh is the average amount of real balances held by the individual for liquidity purposes. 
On the one hand, an increase in commodities and real balances raises utility, thus both 
commodities and real balances yield positive marginal utility. More formally we can say 
Uk = A* > 0 for all k, and Um = /-, h > 0. On the other hand, an increase in the hours 
of work decreases leisure time and consequently lowers utility, thus an increase in hours 
worked has a negative effect on utility, or Un = ^A < 0 . 
Therefore, an individuals' utility can be expressed as a function of the quantity of 
commodities, labor supplied, and the average amount of real money balances. An increase of 
the average amount of real balances and of commodities increases individuals' utility. On the 
other hand, an increase in labor supplied is regarded as a reduction of time for leisure, and 
therefore, reduces individuals' utility. 
2.4 Money in the indirect utility function 
Some economists, however, do not believe that real balances directly yield consumption 
services (Handa, 2000). As opposed to the money in the utility function approach, they 
advocate that real balances allow the consumer to save shopping time and therefore to have 
increased leisure time. Assuming that only consumer goods and leisure directly yield utility, 
leads to the following utility function: 
19 
u(.) = u(c,e). (2) 
In this utility function c is consumption of goods, and 0 is leisure. Both consumption and 
leisure yield positive marginal utility, or more formally UC,UQ > 0. Further assume that to 
buy consumer goods, one needs to secure some shopping time so that leisure is the time 




where h0 is the maximum available time for leisure, work and shopping, n is the time spent 
working, n* is the time spent shopping. In this model, shopping time has negative marginal 
utility because it reduces time for leisure. It is considered that shopping with enough money in 
hand will be quite quick and enjoyable while buyers with other means of payments (transfer of 
bonds, exchange of other commodities) spend more time in shopping and find it tedious as 
they are required to find special suppliers who accept their medium of payments. Therefore, 
the shopping time function is assumed to be such that: 
n° =na(mh, c) (4) 
with A > 0 and /, h < 0, and m
h is average real money balances. Equations (2) and 
(4) above yield the following marginal utility with respect to shopping time: 
du/ =(du/ \d@/ ) < 0 
which means that an increase in shopping time reduces leisure which in turn lowers utility. On 
the other hand, additional real balances that are used to purchase commodities decrease 
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shopping time and increase utility; hence y h =]ou/ ^ Jon / hj>0. In other words, 
having more real money balances reduces time spent shopping and as there is now more time 
to allocate to leisure, utility rises. In this monetary economy in which goods can be exchanged 
for money, people using bonds and goods for exchanges will spend more time shopping. 
However, beyond some limit, say for mh >c, additional real balances are unlikely to decrease 
the time spent shopping, which means that X h = 0 o n c e this special limit has been 
reached. One proportional form of the shopping time function weighted by consumption is: 
nVc^Wc) & 
and substituting this proportional shopping time function (equation 5) into the utility function 
(equation 2) yields: 
U(.) = u(c,hQ-n-c®[
mh/J. (6) 
This means utility is directly a function of consumption and leisure but we have now 
incorporated the determinants of leisure and obtained equation (6). To recognize the new 
determinants of utility, which impact utility indirectly through leisure, we call the new utility 
function V. Thus, the indirect utility function is: 
V{.) = V{c,n,mh) (7) 
With: dV SU 
dm" 50 
c dmh 
since S % @ > 0 and 3 % ^ < 0, therefore dV/^ > 0 . 
Intuitively we are saying that as real money balances reduce time shopping and thus add to an 
individual's enjoyment of leisure, utility rises. It is important to note that the indirect utility 
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function (equation 7) is similar to the direct utility function (equation 1) since both of them 
depend on commodities, time spent working and real balances. Therefore, either incorporating 
money in the utility function by considering it as a good or putting money indirectly in the 
utility function through its shopping time function amounts to the same thing, although the 
latter analysis is more intuitive and thus easier to accept. 
2.5 Money In the Production Function (MIPF) 
Money in the Production Function (MIPF) models are concerned with the incorporation of real 
balances in the firm's production function. In this approach, it is assumed that for a firm to 
produce a commodity xk, the firm's production function embodies real balances as an input. 
"The rationale for putting the firm's real balances as an input in its production function is that 
holding them allows the firm to produce greater output with given amounts of labor and 
capital"(Handa, 2000: 63). Thus assume that, a firm, which produces a commodity, xk has its 
production function specified as follows: 
xk =F\n,K,m
f) (8) 
where xk is the quantity of the k'
h good (k-l,...,K) produced by the klh firm, n is the number 
of workers, K is variable stock of physical capital, and mf are the real balances held by the 
firm. All the first partial derivatives of xk with respect to n, K and m
f are greater than zero. 
This means that having more inputs (including real money balances) allows the firm to 
produce more. 
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In fact, it is assumed that, if a firm does not keep real balances, it will experience trouble in 
paying its employees, suppliers and in selling its output, since it "would have to divert part of 
its labor and capital to somehow arrange for payments and receipts directly in commodities, 
with such diversion reducing the amounts of labor and capital allocated to the production of 
output and thereby reducing the firm's output" (Handa, 2000: 63). Therefore, in a monetary 
economy in which goods are exchanged against money, real balances are considered as an 
input in the production function with higher real balances leading to higher output because the 
firm has no need to divert labor and capital to deal with the payment and receipts process. 
Instead these inputs can be better used to produce output. 
2.6 Money in the indirect production function 
Sometimes it is argued that money does not increase a firm's production and should not 
appear in the production function (Handa, 2000). However, it is possible to formulate a 
production function in which money appears indirectly in the production function in a similar 
way that money is incorporated in the utility function. 
Assume that the firm's production function depends upon capital and part of the labor directly 
employed in production. Nevertheless, the firm has to divert part of its workers to take care of 
transactions involving purchases of raw material and other inputs, hiring labor and selling its 
production. Taking the extreme case where a firm does not hold any money, it would be 
forced to exchange its produced goods for needed inputs, labor and pay dividends in kind. 
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Such a firm could not exist in a modern economy. If the firm had a small amount of money, it 
would still have to allocate some workers to deal with purchases and sales. By holding 
adequate real balances, the firm avoids losing production, as workers are not diverted to these 
other activities. 
The above assertion implies that the production function is: 
xk=xk(>c,nl) (9) 
where xkis the output of the k
th commodity, K\S the physical capital stock, and «, is the labor 
directly involved in production. All the first partial derivatives of xk with respect to K and nx 
are greater than zero, which means more output for more inputs. Having n, means that the 
firm's total employment is composed of the labor directly involved in production «, and 
workers who carry out transactions n2, so that 
n = n, + n2 (10) 
For a given n, an increase in the number of workers performing transactions, n2, decreases «,, 
the labor directly involved in production. This will decrease output. Now consider the 
situation where xk represents input on output transactions. Therefore, for a monetary 
economy, the general form of the transactions technology function can be specified as: 
n2=n2(m
f,xk) (11) 
This function has the feature that n2 (the workers who carry out transactions) decreases with 
an increase in real balances held by the firm ( ny f < 0), and increases with higher 
/dm' 
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amounts of the commodities, xk, involved in transactions (
 2A > 0 ). Therefore, money can 
be also incorporated in the production function in an indirect way by considering that it helps 
avoiding diverting workers to deal with transactions instead of working to produce output. 
Hence, an increase in the number of workers, due to more real balances will indirectly result in 
an increase in output, ceteris paribus, as fewer workers are engaged in unproductive activities 
2.7 The derivation of the money demand function in microeconomics 
2.7.1 The derivation of an individual's demand for money and other goods 
Rational individuals seek to maximize their utility; however, the satisfaction of their needs is 
constrained by the budget at their disposal. It is possible to derive a household demand for real 
balances by maximizing the utility function specified in equation (1) in Section 2.2 above, 
subject to the household budget constraint. Thus one maximizes 
U[xl,...,xk,n,m
h) (12) 
subject to the following budget constraint: 
I,kPkxk+(r-rm)Pm
h=A0+Wn k=\,...,K. (13) 
In this constraint pk is the price of the k'
h commodity, P is the price level, Wis the nominal 
wage rate, and A0 is the nominal value of the initial endowment of commodities and financial 
assets. Recall that xk is the quantity of theft"
1 commodity (k = 1,..., K), n is labor supplied in 
hours, and mh is the average amount of real balances held by households for their liquidity 
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services. The second term in (13), (r-rm)Pm
h, is the total user cost of holding a nominal 
amount of money Pmh. While (r-rm) is the interest rate forgone per unit of money held with 
r being the market interest rate on assets other than money and rm is the interest rate paid on 
nominal balances. 
We can first set the Lagrangian equal to: 
L = u(x,...,xkn,m
h)+A\£kpkxk + (r-rm)Pm
h -A0-Wn\ (14) 
Taking the first derivatives of the Lagrangian above with respect to each of the endogenous 
variables xx,..., xk,n, m
h, Xand setting them equal to zero yields the first-order maximizing 
conditions as: 
' =Uk-Apk=0 k=l,...,K (15) 
dxk 
d± = Un-XW = K (16) 
on 
Um-A{r-rm)P = 0 (17) 
dm 
Assuming that the second-order conditions for maximization are satisfied the equations above 
give a solution for the endogenous variables, based on this maximizing procedure, in general 
form as: 
x? =xdk
h{p„...,pk,W,(r-rm)P,A0), k=\,...,K (19) 
ns =ns(p„...,pk,W,(r-rm)P,A0),™d (20) 
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mdh -m*ipx pk,W,(r-rm)P,A0) (21) 
where the superscripts d, s and h stand respectively for demand, supply and households. 
Hence, the demand for real balances in equation (21) is a function of the price of commodities, 
the nominal wage rate, the user cost of real balances and the nominal initial endowment, xf is 
the households' demand for commodity k, while ns stands for the supply of labor. 
It is worth mentioning that a proportionate increase in the nominal variables px,...,pk,W, and 
A0, to apx,...,apk,aW,aA0 does not change the quantities of real balances and commodities 
demanded and also does not affect the supply of labor. Formally expressed, the first-order 
conditions (15), (16), (17), (18) and the solution for the variables xf, ns and mdh respectively 
given in (19), (20), (21) obtained by maximizing U\xl,...,xk,n,m
h) subject to the budget 
constraint V pkxk +{r-rm )Pm
h = Ag+Wn, yields the same result as maximizing 
U\xx,...,xk,n,m
h) subject to ^ opkxk +{r-rm)aPm = aAa +aWn . This new maximization 
gives for a positive a : 
xdk
h=xdk
h(apx,...,apk,aW,(r-rm)aP,aA0) k=l,...,K (22) 
ns = ns(apx,...,apk,aW,(r -rm)aP,aA0) (23) 
mdh =mdh{ap„...,apk,aW,(r-rm)aP,aA0)- (24) 
Therefore, since a proportionate change of the nominal exogenous variables from 
(pl,...,pk,W,A0) to (apl,...,apk,aW,aA0) does not affect quantities demanded xf and m
dh, 
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and supplied n5, the demand and supply functions in equations (19), (20), (21) are said to be 
homogeneous of degree zero in p{,...,pk,W,A0. This feature, homogeneity of degree zero, of 
the demand for real balances has the corollary that money is neutral provided that all prices 
(including wages) increase in the same proportion, the real value of the initial endowment 
does not change, interest is paid on all money balances, and there is no anticipation of further 
price changes or errors in inflationary expectations (Handa, 2000). However, these are rather 
stringent conditions and money is not neutral in the short-run (Mankiw, 1999). It is of some 
interest that in our empirical chapter in Section 4.3 that real money demand is not 
homogeneous. Further, it can be asserted that the demands for commodities and real balances 
and the supply of labor depend only upon relative prices - but not absolute prices - and the 
real value of initial endowments (Handa, 2000). This follows directly from the homogeneity 
feature of the solutions for endogenous variables. If one was to set a equal to the inverse of 
the price level P, the equations (22), (23), and (24) become, for a = IIP: 
4h =4h{P/p^Pk/p^W/pXr-rm),
A/p\j k=l,...,K (25) 
Pi/ Pk/ W/ (r-r \
 Ao/\ (26) 
m" =mM[p/p,..j/pypXr-rm),yp^ (27) 
As the optimal real demands and the real supply are unchanged (from the homogeneity 
feature) but the exogenous variables change to reflect relative prices, we can justify the above 
assertion. In (27), the household's demand for real balances appears to be a function of the 
n = n 
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opportunity cost of holding money, the real wage rate, the real value of initial endowments, 
and the relative prices of commodities. 
2.7.2 Deriving the firm's demand for money and for other goods 
After deriving the household's demand for money, we now turn to the derivation of the firm's 
demand for money and for other goods. It is assumed that the firm operates in perfect 
competition and seeks to maximize its profit, which is the difference between its total revenue 
and total costs. The firm's profit function is specified as: 
n = pkF(n,K,m
f)- Wn - pKK - pmm
f - F0 (28) 
The elements of this profit function are: 
IT is the firm's profit, pkF\n,K,m
f) is the total revenue of the firm, Wn is the wage bill, pK 
is the nominal user cost of variable physical capital K , F0 is the firm's fixed costs, pm is the 
nominal user cost of real money balances. But we know from equation (13) that the nominal 
cost of real money balances is {r~rm)P. The nominal user cost of capital is thus 
PK
 =(r~ KK)PK •
 m o mer words the real rate of interest is adjusted for price increases of the 
capital good. This is what a firm gives up by holding capital. With these definitions of the 
nominal cost of real balances and capital we can transform equation (28) to: 
n = pkF{n,K,m
f)~ Wn - (r-JvK)pKK - (r - rm)Pm
f - F0. (29) 
Now, to get the optimal values of the variables n, K , and mf we need to take the first 
derivatives of the profit function n with respect to these variables and set them equal to zero. 





= PkF„-W = Oi 








We divide the set by P to get: 
Pk/\F =W/ 








Equations (33) to (35) can be solved for the firm's demand for labor nd, its demand for capital 
kd, and mdf the firm's demand for real balances. This procedure produces: 
nd=nd Pkt PKJ ^^{r-n^ypUr-rJ 
•d = r*\P Ka =Kyyp,wXr-nKyypUr-rm) 




Noting that we can use w, the real wage, for W/P. Then substituting equations (36) to (38) in 
xk - F[n,K,m
f) - the firm's production function as specified in equation (8) above - gives the 
supply function for commodities: 
X' =X' ],...//p,w,(r-Uk)[P/pyr~rm)^ (39) 
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From equations (36) through (39) we learn that firms' demands for real balances, for labor, 
and for capital as well as the firm's supply for commodities depend only upon relative and not 
absolute prices. We also learn that, proportionate increases in px,...,pk,W and P do not affect 
quantities of inputs demanded and outputs supplied by the firm; hence equations (36) through 
(39) are homogeneous of degree zero in pi,...,pk,W and P provided the user costs {r-nK) 
and (r - r ) remain constant. We now turn to consider the aggregate demand for money. 
2.7.3 Deriving aggregate demand for money 
In Section 2.7.1 we show the household's optimal demand for real balances. In order to avoid 
confusion, we keep the demand for real money balances as mdh but recognize this refers to the 
aggregate holding of real balances by households. The aggregate households' real money 
demand function is thus (equation 27): 
A. m*-m*[yp^P/pt%ir-rm\ypJ (40) 
Similarly, equation (38) is the firm's demand for real balances. Again having the aggregate 
demand for real balances for the firms to be represented by the same symbol we have: 
mdf = mdf \,../k/p^,{r-7rK)[Pypyr-rm)\ (41) 
Finally, combining the consumers' aggregate demand for real balances, mdh, in equation (40) 
and the firms' aggregate demand for real balances mdf in equation (41) gives the economy's 





It is important to mention that, the microeconomic derivation of the demand for money, which 
stems from a conventional demand for goods approach, expresses the demand for money in 
real terms. The determinants of the demand for real money in (42) can be divided in two broad 
categories: (i) one part that represents income or wealth, and (ii) a second portion standing for 
the opportunity costs of holding money rather than its alternatives. The analysis of money 
demand needs to simplify this set of determinants. It bears pointing out that our specification 
of money demand in Chapter Four has elements of equation (42) in that it includes a variable 
that captures all prices, another for real GDP, and a variable that attempts to capture the 
opportunity costs of holding money. Thus our empirical specification is close to the elements 
of (42) although it does not include endowments. 
2.8 The aggregate demand for money: a simplification for macroeconomic models 
To simplify the demand for money in macroeconomics we drop some of the independent 
variables that are present in microeconomic specification of the demand for money function. 
Recall equation (27), m , which is the household's demand for real balances. 
Macroeconomic analysis makes the above equation much simpler by ignoring the 
heterogeneity of commodities and their individual prices, even though they are fundamental to 
understanding why households and firms will hold money to facilitate transactions among 
f 
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Pkj commodities (Handa, 2000). Thus, assuming the relative prices Fyp,...,
 k/p are constant and 
excluding them from (43) yields: 
mdh=mdh lW/p,(r-rm),
A/p). (44) 
Moreover, economists rarely want to study the interaction between the demand for money and 
the supply of labor, but rather focus on national income in the macro economy. Recognizing 
that not all income is earned in typical labor market, we substitute real wages, /p, by full 
real labor income yL. This means the aggregate household demand for money becomes: 
mdh=mdh[yL,{r-rm),
Ao/^ (45) 
We now consider the firm's demand for real balances which in (38) was formulated as: 
mdf = mdf Pi/ Pk/ W/ (r-n \\PK/)(r-r \ ypt—t /pi /p'V nxA /p pv 'mi (46) 
In macroeconomics we simplify the above equation for following reasons: (i) first we 
eliminate the relative prices of commodities as they are assumed to remain constant; (ii) we 
then assume equality between the rate of inflation of the prices of capital goods and the 
inflation rate in the economy. Now we can simplify (46) and substituting "/p with yL yields: 
(47) 
Finally, adding equations (46) and (47) together yields the macroeconomic specification of the 




L,\ °/p (48) 
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This specification means that, the demand for real balances in the economy depends on the 
user cost of the physical capital (r - n), the user cost of holding money (r - rm), real labor 
A / income y and the real value of the initial wealth °/p . 
The Keynesian tradition further simplifies (48) by substituting both the real labor income yL 
A / and the real value of initial wealth %, by the current real income y, which is equal to labor 
income plus a return on wealth. This changes the economy's demand for real balances to: 
m
d =md{(r-n),(r-rm),y) (49) 
Again we note that, the demand for money is in real terms. Also as Judd and Scadding (1982) 
assert, economic theory generally relates the quantity of money demanded to a small set of key 
variables linking money to the real sector of the economy. This small set of variables is 
composed of the real income, on the one hand, and the opportunity cost of holding money on 
the other hand (Sriram, 1999). The model used for empirical testing in Chapter Four is based 
on (49) as it asserts nominal balances are a function of prices, y and (r - rm ) . We now turn to 
the presentation of the various money demand models that focus on each of Keynes' three 
motives for holding money. 
2.9 The transactions demand for money 
In The General Theory, Keynes subdivided the demand for money into three components 
representing three motives for holding money: transactions, precautionary and the speculative. 
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However, he did not provide distinctive rigorous analyses for the determination of the demand 
for money for each of these motives. In the 1950's, Baumol and Tobin managed to formulate a 
more rigorous theory based on these motives of holding money that other economists 
subsequently extended. 
Keynes in The General theory defines the transactions motive as "the need of cash for the 
current transactions of personal and business exchanges" (Keynes, 1936: 170). However, 
Keynes (1936) failed to substantiate this claim in a detailed model. He assumes the 
transactions and the precautionary motives "absorb a quantity of cash which is not very 
sensitive to changes in the rate of interest as such...apart from its reactions on the level of 
income" (Keynes, 1936). Thus, he specified the joint demand for money based on transactions 
and precautionary motives as: 
M'r=kY (50) 
where M'r is the joint transactions and precautionary demand for money, Y is nominal income 
and k is a constant. Equation (50) implies that increases in Y increase M'r. Moreover, Keynes 
and many of the traditional classical economists assumed that the elasticity of the demand for 
transactions balances with respect to nominal income was equal to one. "In particular, the 
demand for transactions balances was taken to double if either the price level or real income -
but not both - doubled. Hardly any analysis was presented in support of such a statement and 
it remained very much in the realm of an assumption" (Handa, 2000: 86-87). The assumption 
of unitary elasticity came under attack by Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956) who later 
formulated the transactions demand for money balances by applying an inventory approach to 
the problem. 
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2.9.1 Baumol's application of the basic inventory analysis to the transactions demand 
for money 
Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956) formulated a theory of money demand in which money is 
essentially considered as an inventory held for transactions purposes. Such an inventory 
(money) is held in order to reduce the transactions costs of going between money and financial 
assets others than money (Sriram, 1999). Baumol (1952) constructs a model of money demand 
that shows the optimal holding of real money balances when an individual faces an interest 
cost by holding money and a transaction cost of converting assets to money. The model makes 
the following assumptions: 
(i) The timing and amount of expenditures and receipts are certain; 
(ii) Individuals make all their payments of Y expenditures in money that they already 
have at their disposal. They spend the money they possess in constant stream for a 
given period; 
(iii) Only two assets are available: bonds, which pay an interest rate of r and money, 
which does not pay any interest. Bonds include savings deposits and other financial 
assets. Further, there are transfer costs when converting bonds to money and vice 
versa, but there are no own service costs of using money or bonds; 
(iv) Constant withdrawals of cash from bonds are made in lots of W during equally 
spaced lengths of time over a given period. Each time that the individual "makes a 
withdrawal, he must incur a brokerage (bonds-money transfer) cost that has two 
components: a fixed cost of B0 per withdrawal and a variable cost of 5, per dollar 
withdrawn. Examples of such brokerage costs are brokers' commission, banking 
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charges and own (or personal) costs in terms of time and convenience for 
withdrawals from bonds. The overall cost per withdrawal of W 
is(50 +5 ir)"(Handa, 2000: 87). 
At the beginning of the period an individual has at his disposal an income F held in the form 
of both bonds B and money M. He spends his income Fover the period in a continuous steady 
stream. We now describe the workings of the Baumol model in greater detail. 
lAY 
0 1 time 
Figure 2.1 Basic inventory analysis of the transactions demand for money (one period) 
Source: Handa (2000: 88) 
In Figure 2.1, income Y is represented on the vertical axis while periods of time are 
represented on the horizontal. In this figure the solid line (principal diagonal) from Fto 1 (on 
the horizontal axis) represents the remaining amount of income at the disposal of the 
individual at various points of time. Thus the triangle YA1 shows the amount of income that 
has already been spent at various points of time over the whole period. Area 0Y1 is equal to 
V2 Y* 1 over the period, which means that an individual who starts the whole period with an 
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income Y that he spends in constant amounts over the period has an average holding of money 
equal to Y/2. 
% 2/4 3/4 Time 
Figure 2.2 Basic inventory analysis of the transactions demand for money (period subdivided) 
Source: Handa (2000: 88) 
In Figure 2.2 above, we still have one period but it is now subdivided into four weeks. The 
individual withdraws an amount W at the beginning of the week, spends it in an even stream 
and has to withdraw W at the beginning of each week. Figure 2.2 shows that the individual's 
average cash balances over the period are Vz W. 
Holding money means two costs for an individual. First, he incurs a brokerage cost of 
(Bo +BJV) per withdrawal of W; therefore, the cost of withdrawing an amount Y from bonds 
is equal to[(i?0 +B1WW/L) where ^/ gives the number of withdrawals of lots of W from 
Y. The second cost is the interest rate forgone due to the holding of V% W on average over the 
period instead of holding it in bonds that pay an interest rate of r. This second cost is thus 
— Wr. Therefore, the total opportunity cost C is the sum of the two costs, which gives: 
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developed countries (Handa, 2000). It is of some interest that our estimation of the long-run 
money demand in Rwanda, detailed in Section 4.2, finds that the interest rate plays no role and 
the elasticity of money demand with respect to real income is 0.596 which is close to the 
implied theoretical level. 
2.9.2 Issues about holding currency or demand deposits 
We have not addressed the interesting issue concerning the decision to hold notes and coins 
rather than demand deposits. In this regard the convenience and safety specific to holding 
currency rather than demand deposits needs to be taken into consideration. 
It has been observed that people prefer demand deposits to cash holdings for safety reasons. In 
many countries carrying large sums of money is very risky as one may be robbed. This means 
demand deposits are preferred to currency. However, in those countries with little theft, 
individuals avoid demand deposits and pay for most transactions in cash (Handa, 2000). In 
general, in most developed economies or urban sectors of developing countries, individuals 
tend to prefer demand deposits for transactions rather than currency. Conversely, in many less-
developed economies and especially in rural areas poorly served by banks, people prefer to 
hold currency instead of demand deposit since the latter involves brokerage costs as envisaged 
in the Baumol model. 
The advent of technological innovations in the financial sector such as the increasing use of 
electronic or smart cards and the proliferation of digital cards has reduced but not entirely 
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eliminated currency demand. In other words W in Figure 2.2 has fallen. So, the general 
conclusions of the Baumol model remain intact as "in the aggregate, the demand for real 
transactions balances increases less than proportionately with real expenditures, decreases 
with the yield on alternative assets; and does not change if all prices change 
proportionately"(Handa, 2000: 97). 
2.10 The speculative demand for money 
2.10.1 Keynes' speculative demand for money 
The speculative demand for money is introduced in the literature by Keynes who defines the 
speculative motive of holding money as "the object of securing profit from knowing better 
than the market what the future will bring forth"(Keynes, 1936: 170). In his The General 
Theory, Keynes asserted that the speculative demand for money resulted from the uncertainty 
as to the future of the rate of interest. Assuming that there are two assets: (i) either individuals 
can hold money that does not have any yield, or (ii) they can keep bonds that have a positive 
yield. Since people have different views on the future interest rate, those who believe that the 
interest rate will be higher in the future than the one assumed by the market will tend to hold 
money in order to make profit. In fact, for this group of people who believe that the interest 
rate will rise and the price of bonds will fall, they prefer to sell their bonds now and hold 
money in order to avoid capital losses in the future. On the other hand, individuals who think 
that the interest rate will be the one assumed by the market will tend to hold bonds instead of 
money, since as they think that the interest rate will fall thus raising bond prices. Therefore, 
they choose to hold bonds now rather than money (Keynes, 1936). Hence, in Keynes view, the 
42 
speculative demand for money can be written as:Msp = L(r) where,Msp is the speculative 
demand for money, r is the market rate of interest and L(r) is Keynes' degree of the liquidity 
preference. This explanation applies to a single individual. Now concerning the aggregate 
demand function, Keynes argues that since investor's expectations as to the future interest rate 
differ, then at high rates of interest more investors will expect them to fall and few will hold 
cash. Conversely, at rather low rates of interest, only a few investors will expect them to fall 
further and most investors will hold cash. This implies that the aggregate demand for money is 
a continuous downward sloping curve Msp as shown in Figure 2.3 below. 
M sp 
Figure 2.3 Keynes' degree of liquidity preference 
Source: Handa (2000: 39) 
2.10.2 Formalization of Keynes' speculative demand for money by Tobin 
Tobin (1958) postulates that an individual chooses to hold money as part of a portfolio 
because the rate of return on holding money is more certain than the rate of return on holding 
earning assets. In other words, holding assets other than money is riskier than holding just 
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money alone. This difference in riskness can be explained by the fact that alternative assets 
(bonds and equities) are subject to market price volatility, while money is not (Sriram, 1999). 
Tobin (1958) formalizes Keynes' approach of the speculative demand for money. He assumed 
like Keynes that people have only two assets in which to invest: (i) money which does not 
provide any yield and is risk free and (ii) bonds which have a non-zero yield and the yield has 
a positive standard deviation indicating these bonds are risky. He further assumes that, the 
bond is a consol, which is unredeemable. A consol pays a fixed coupon c indefinitely. Thus, in 
perfect capital markets, the market price pb of a consol paying a coupon c per period is given 
by its present discounted value at the market rate of interest, x, on loans as follows (Handa, 
2000): 
c c 






= c - 1 
V l + x J 
= c \xj x 
(For c=x A,=l) 
Assuming r to be the current return on consols, or the coupon payment and regarding re, as 
the future expected market rate of return on consols as the expected rate of discount, then Pb 
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is r/re. It is usual to consider the expected capital gain or loss on the consol as g, which can be 
written as g = ye -1. Then, the sum of the coupon (r) and the capital gain (g) is the expected 
yield (r + g) given by r + g = r-\ 1. If the yield (r + g) is positive, (r + g) > 0, rational 
re 
individuals will purchase the consol instead of holding money, which has a yield equal to zero. 
Conversely, for a negative yield or (r + g) < 0, it is rational to hold money which in this case 
has a great yield. Between the positive yield (r + g)> 0 and the negative one (r + g) < 0, there 
is a zero yield (r + g = 0), which is known as the switch point concerning the choice between 
keeping money or consols. We can derive a critical return rc indicating that interest rate at 
which an individual will switch from holding consols to money. This critical switching yield is 
or rc. Thus if the individual makes the correct guess as to re, any r above rc indicates 
l + re 
positive yields can be made on consols. The individual will hold no money. 
This situation is illustrated in Figure 2.4 below. 
A 
rc , B 
W M> 
Figure 2.4 Tobin's formalization of Keynes' version of the speculative demand for money 
Source: Handa (2000: 39) 
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For any current interest rate greater than the critical level (r > rc), the whole portfolio W o£ 
rational individuals will be held in consols, so that money balances will be equal to zero for 
interest rates along AB. On the other hand, for a current interest rate less than the critical level 
i.e. (r < rc), rational individuals will hold their entire portfolio W as money. This is 
represented in Figure 2.4 by the portion of the demand for money CW. Thus, the individual's 
demand for money appears to be the discontinuous step function (AB, CW). A smooth 
downward sloping money demand function is obtained by assuming many investors who do 
not have the same critical level of the interest rate. 
2.11 The precautionary demand for money 
Keynes (1936) argues that there is also a precautionary motive for holding money balances 
that he defined as: "the desire for security as to the future cash equivalent of certain proportion 
of total resources"(Keynes, 1936: 170). The precautionary motive arose because of the 
uncertainty of future income and consumption needs and purchases (Whalen, 1966). 
Therefore, individuals hold money to avoid being obliged to convert their non-money assets 
into cash when an eventual need for purchases arise. Precautionary money balances are the 
means of paying for unexpected expenditures during a period (Handa, 2000). The more people 
expect to make expenditures in the near future, the greater will be the amount of money held. 
Conversely, as the probability of a need for expenditures in the near future decreases, the 
amount of cash held decreases. 
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Recall that in Section 2.10 above, the speculative demand for money is analyzed using the 
assumption that yields of various assets are uncertain but existing wealth is known; while the 
transactions demand for money is analyzed (in Section 2.9 above) by assuming the certainty 
over the amounts and timing of income receipts and expenditures. Models of the precautionary 
demand for money assume uncertainty of income and expenditures in the future. Unlike the 
speculative demand for money, which puts a great deal of emphasis on the uncertainty of 
yields, the precautionary demand for money analysis is simplified by assuming that these 
yields are certain. "Given this assumption, the analysis of the precautionary demand for 
money is an extension of the inventory analysis of the transactions demand to the case of the 
uncertainty of the amount and timing of income receipts and expenditures"(Handa, 2000: 
129). A model of precautionary balances is based on the model used to explain transactions 
balances. The general formula of the inventory analysis of the transactions demand for money 
is derived in equation (54) above and can be written generally as: 
m'rd =m'rd(b,r,y) (55) 
Where mtrd is the transactions demand for real balances, b is the real brokerage cost, r is the 
interest rate and y is the real income. Uncertainty as to income is had by y following a normal 
distribution with mean value jUy and standard deviation o y. Two other elements are required in 
this model: (i) the degree of risk aversion p, and (ii) the available substitutes that allow 
payments for sudden unexpected expenditures. These substitutes we call Q. Examples of such 
substitutes are credit cards or overdrafts. Hence, equation (55) is modified to give the general 
version of the precautionary demand for money as: 
mprd =mprd(b,r,My,cTy,p,d) (56) 
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Where: mprd is the precautionary demand for money, b is the real brokerage cost, r is the 
interest rate, py is the mean of the distribution of income, ay is the standard deviation of 
income, p is the degree of risk aversion, and Q, stands for the substitutes for precautionary 
money balances. The salient feature of equations (55) and (56) is that the demand for money is 
a demand for real balances. Also, two categories of determinants can be observed: (i) income 
which influences demand for money positively, and (ii) a set of opportunity costs whose 
increase tends to reduce real balances held. A conclusion we reached in Section 2.9 and 
Section 2.10 as well. Our empirical specification attempts to capture these features by using a 
relatively broad definition of money. 
2.12 Theoretical underpinning of the money demand specification to be used in our 
empirical chapter 
This section brings together all the above and provides the theoretical justification for the 
model we use in empirical testing in this thesis. Our empirical work is based on Nell (2003) 
and the following long-run money demand specification: 
ml, =J30 +0xyt +/32p
c
t+p,{RM-RO)t +u,. 
In this model, m2 (see Section 4.2, page 94) is the demand for nominal M2 money balances 
(currency plus demand deposits plus quasi money), y is real income, pc the price level, RM is 
the long-term opportunity cost of holding money, RO is the long-term own interest rate on 
money and ut is the error term. Lower case letters denote variables in natural logarithms and 
Chapter Four makes specific use of this formulation of money demand. We are able to justify 
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this specification based on concluding in Section 2.7 that the estimated function must include 
real income, the price level and the opportunity cost of holding money. Section 2.8 justifies 
this specification in terms of nominal balances. Sections 2.9 onwards do not change the 
determinants of money demand but do suggest use be made of a broad definition of money. 
We do this by using M2 rather than Ml in our study of money demand in Rwanda. 
Concerning the influence of income on the demand for money, Beguna et al. (2002) contends 
that classical economists theorized that the primary determinant of the demand for nominal 
balances (M) was an individual's nominal income level (PY) determined by the output level 
(Y) and the price level (P). This is because classical economists such as Irving Fischer and 
Alfred Marshall argued that the demand for money arose predominantly from holding money 
as a medium of exchange for transactions purposes. In their contribution to money demand 
theory, monetarists reinterpreted the quantity theory as representing an economy's demand for 
money, so that they were able to structure an explanation for how an increase in the money 
supply caused an increase in economic activity. This results in what is known as the modern 
quantity theory of money in which the original quantity equation is specified as M = (l/v)PQ. 
The latter was regarded as a behavioral equation that reflects the economy's demand for 
money, so that as nominal income PQ increases, the demand for money increases (Kennedy, 
2000). 
As pointed out in Section 2.9 of this chapter, Keynes assumes, like classical economists, that 
transactions were proportional to income. Therefore, he defined the transactions demand for 
money to be proportional to income. We have seen in this chapter that Baumol (1952), Tobin 
(1956) supported by other research did not deny this conclusion in that income still has a 
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positive impact on money demand. Keynes, however, develops a theory of money demand that 
adds a role for the interest rate. He bases his analysis of money demand on the individuals' 
decision making process and derived the so-called liquidity preference function in which the 
demand for real balances is negatively related to the interest rate and positively related to real 
income. Since we know that the question in monetary policy is whether, or to what extent, the 
quantity of money demand is affected by changes in interest rates (Mishkin, 1998), it is 
interesting for us to look at the dynamics of interest rates in Rwanda. Beguna et al. (2002) 
asserts that theories of demand for money are developed around a trade-off between the 
benefits of holding more money against the interest costs of doing so. The cost of holding 
money could be defined as the difference between the interest rates paid on money and the 
interest rate paid on the other assets such as savings deposits. The interest rate on money is 
referred to as the own rate of interest, and the opportunity cost of holding money is equal to 
the difference between the interest on other assets and the own rate. This is consistent with the 
interest rate differential that is present in our empirical model (in Section 4.2) and is in 
accordance with our previous developments in this chapter in equations (42) and (49). In 
addition, Nell (2003) asserts that the role of interest rate effect in our empirical money demand 
specification is particularly relevant under a monetary system where the central bank sets the 
supply price of reserves through its control over the interest rate. If money determines prices 
and the interest rate is a significant determinant in the money demand function, then the 
simple transmission mechanism is: 
Interest rate * Money * Prices. 
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Therefore, theory generally relates the quantity of money demanded to a small set of key 
variables linking money to the real sector of economy (Judd and Scadding, 1982). Money 
demand theories suggests that the demand for money is a function of a scale variable as 
measure of economic activity, and a set of opportunity cost variables to indicate the forgone 
earnings by holding assets which constitute alternatives to money (Sriram, 1999). Also as we 
work with nominal balances, we must include the price level as a variable. Thus in terms of 
our first hypothesis (Chapter One, page five) stability means finding relationships between the 
interest rate and prices that do not vary with time, thus supporting this simple transmission 
mechanism. In Rwanda we find that prices and income are important determinants of nominal 
money demand. In terms of our second hypothesis (Chapter One, page five), which attempts to 
model the link between money and prices, we find that prices determine money. Thus in our 
transmission mechanism above the first arrow is non-existent (and remains so over time) and 
the second arrow points in the other direction for Rwanda. 
2.13 Summary and conclusion 
This chapter traces the theoretical contributions of various economists to money demand, and 
provides the basis for an economic analysis of the role, and the relevant determinants, of 
money demand in economy. It presents the models of money in the utility function (MIUF) 
and money in the production function (MIPF). In fact, money can be incorporated directly into 
the utility function because the utility function expresses preferences and also because 
individuals prefer more cash to less. Money deserves to be included in the utility function just 
like any other good. However, some economists argue that money must not be incorporated in 
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the utility function directly but indirectly because it does not yield consumption services; 
rather it helps the consumer to save time, therefore increasing leisure. On the other hand, the 
rationale for including the firm's real balances as an input, like other inputs, in the firm's 
production function is that in an economy requiring the exchange of goods against money, 
holding real balances allows the firm to produce more output with given amounts of capital 
and labor. In other words, the justification for money to be an argument of the firm's 
production function either directly or indirectly is that its usage increases the proportion of 
firm's labor force and capital engaged directly in production. Therefore, the firm has no need 
to divert labor and capital to deal with the payment and receipts process, and as a consequence 
the firm produces more. 
The maximization of the household's utility function and the firm's production function yields 
the household's and the firm's demand for real balances respectively. The individual's 
demand for real balances is homogeneous of degree zero in all prices (including wages) and in 
the nominal value of initial endowments; while the firm's demand for real balances is also 
homogeneous of degree zero in the firm's output and input prices. This feature of 
homogeneity of degree zero of the household's and firm's demand for real balances implies 
that money is neutral provided that all prices (including wages) increase in the same 
proportion, the real value of initial endowment does not change, interest rate is paid on all 
money balances, and there is no anticipation of further price changes or errors in inflationary 
expectations. These are rather stringent conditions and money is not neutral in the short-run 
(Mankiw, 1999). Our results in Chapter Four suggest that money is not homogeneous. Based 
on our results we cannot say anything as to the neutrality of money. However we can say that 
prices change by more than does money. So we can say that money is not superneutral, as an 
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increase in the growth rate of money results in prices rising by higher amount, resulting in 
lower real money balances. 
The combination of households' and firms' demand for real balances yields the aggregate 
(economy's) demand for real balances in the context of the Warlasian general equilibrium 
model which provides the foundation for a microeconomic analysis of markets in the economy 
determine individual prices in the economy. However, in order to ease the analysis, 
macroeconomics drops some of the independent variables that are present in the demand for 
money function derived from the perspective of the Warlasian general equilibrium. We test 
one such simplified version in Chapter Four. 
In The General theory, Keynes specified that an individual's real balances come from three 
motives: transactions, speculative, and precautionary. Nevertheless, Keynes failed to 
substantiate this claim in a detailed model. Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956) managed to 
formulate the transactions demand for money balances through an inventory approach. Their 
finding was that the transactions demand for money depends negatively on the interest rate 
and its elasticity with respect to the real level of expenditures is less than unity. We find 
empirical support for this. Keynes introduced the speculative demand for money in the 
literature and asserted that it resulted from uncertainty as to the future of the interest rate; this 
led to Keynes' so-called degree of liquidity preference. Tobin (1958) formalized Keynes' 
approach and reached also the conclusion that the individual's demand for money is a function 
of the rate of interest. Precautionary money balances are a means of paying for unexpected 
expenditures arising during a period. The more people expect to make expenditures in the near 
future, the greater will be the amount of money held. Conversely, as the probability of need 
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for expenditures in the near future decreases, the amount of cash held decreases in favor of an 
increase in other non-money assets. This suggests that any optimal work use as broad money 
as is possible given any country's structural constraints. The purpose of this chapter is to 
provide the link between theoretical developments and the money demand function that is 
going to be used in our empirical chapter. Essentially this chapter suggests our model embody 
income as a scale variable, includes the price level and some measure of an interest rate 
differential. We are faithful to this specification in Chapter Four. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE EVOLUTION OF MONETARY POLICY IN RWANDA 
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the developments in monetary policy 
in Rwanda since 1964, but concentrating on more recent changes to the conduct of monetary 
policy in the late 1980's and the whole of 1990's. We begin by giving a broad overview of 
developments as regards monetary policy. The chapter then examines, in some detail, 
monetary policy prior to the reforms made under the structural adjustment programme and 
points out the various shortcomings of this older monetary arrangement. In Section 3.3, the 
chapter moves on to examine a second time period in Rwandan monetary history characterized 
by monetary reforms. Under this new policy commercial banking is liberalized, no longer is 
government debt monetised, and the central bank makes greater use of indirect instruments of 
control. Instruments used to control the money supply are examined in some detail and we 
conclude this chapter by pointing out some of the obstacles that the monetary authorities face 
when attempting to achieve their targets for inflation. A final section concludes with our 
original suggestion that a baseline money demand function must be estimated for Rwanda. 
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3.2 Overview of monetary reforms in Rwanda 
The National Bank of Rwanda (NBR) was instituted under the terms of the law in April 1964 
as a national, publicly owned, establishment equipped with a civil personality and financial 
autonomy. The NBR has the following general missions: 
(i) To formulate and implement monetary policy to protect the value of the currency 
and to ensure stability of the Rwandan Franc. For this purpose, it controls the 
currency and manages operations in the money market, regulates banking 
structures and monitors the foreign exchange market (NBR, 1999); 
(ii) Has the exclusive privilege of providing currency or legal tender in Rwanda; 
(iii) Manages the State's portfolio at its disposal and ensures the execution of financial 
transactions on behalf of the State, that is, the NBR is the financial agent of the 
State for any credit, banking, and cash transactions. 
Since its establishment, the NBR had to ensure that monetary and credit conditions were in 
accordance with the overall economic policies decided by the Rwandan government at least 
until 1990, when the implementation of the IMF's Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facilities 
(ESAF) in Rwanda began. Later, a law was passed in 1997, to give the NBR greater 
autonomy. Further, a new banking law was adopted and promulgated in June 1999, giving the 
necessary power to the board of the NBR to determine monetary policy. This law has also 
strengthened the NBR's role in supervising financial institutions and enforcing rules of sound 
banking practice that are in conformity with international standards. 
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The NBR, right from its inception, has been called upon to support the economic policies of 
the State. This has been difficult as the NBR's goals are to ensure macroeconomic stability 
through careful monetary management, adopt a suitable exchange rate policy and support 
efficient banking supervision. These goals may not always be in line with the state's policies. 
The ESAF, which began in 1990, gave monetary policy another way to influence financial 
markets. With the disappearance of the credit rationing, rediscounting and setting of interest 
rates, a new era emerged, as regards monetary management, characterized in particular, by the 
introduction of the money market as a main source of funds and it became the arena for the 
determination of interest rates. In other words, interest rates were now determined by the 
market. 
The NBR intervenes in the money market primarily through weekly money market operations 
using treasury bills. These interventions are intended to inject or to mop up excess liquidity, 
according to the overall stance of the banking system's excess reserves and taking into account 
the aims of current monetary policy. This adjustment of the banking system's liquidity, while 
influencing the monetary creation capacity of commercial banks, makes it possible to 
influence a short-term interest rate. In addition to this procedure, discount window facilities 
were also initiated. Available most of the time, the discount window at the NBR intended to 
offer liquidity as a last resort to institutions needing a temporary injection of liquidity. The 
interest rate at the discount window is determined by the NBR, and is modified when 
necessary, taking into account the economic situation and in order to ensure the achievement 
of the final objectives of monetary policy. In addition, the money market is also used as a 
suitable vehicle for the buying and selling of treasury bills, both on behalf of the State and for 
the needs of monetary policy. Given that there is greater and greater use of the treasury bill 
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under newer monetary arrangements, the general public has become more familiar with this 
instrument. 
Initiated in 1990, reserve requirements control excess liquidity by limiting the ability of banks 
to create money through increased loans. This instrument was the subject of multiple 
amendments that not only changed the rules of complying with regulations concerning reserve 
requirements, but also changing the penalty rate imposed on those banks that failed to meet 
their reserve requirements. A flexible exchange rate regime was introduced in Rwanda in 
March 1995 with the creation of foreign exchange markets, which meant exchange rates were 
now partially determined by the forces of demand and supply. The NBR does however ensure 
a smooth path of exchange rates by occasional intervention. To this end, each day, the NBR 
computes a reference exchange rate that banks are required to apply in their operations. 
The war and the genocide seriously affected the financial system in Rwanda. Thus the NBR 
had to move quickly with the necessary counter measures to prevent its adverse effects, while 
at the same time proceeding with the revision of the regulations and the legal framework 
governing financial intermediation activities. The new banking regulations recommend in 
particular, the need for strict banking supervision, making sure commercial banks complied 
with sensible rules of sound banking practice. The minimum capital required by a commercial 
bank was raised to 1500 million Rwadan Francs or about 17 million Rand. Soon after the war 
and genocide, Rwanda engaged in an effort to rebuild the economy and restore 
macroeconomic stability initially using the IMF's ESAF, and then using the IMF's Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Facilities (PRGF), which is still the case. 
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The implementation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy in Rwanda is guided, among other 
things, by the following key principles: 
(i) Policy coherence: any changes must be consistently applied and not be in conflict 
with national policy; 
(ii) Needs and expenditures must be listed in order of priority to ensure that available 
resources are put to their best use (MINECOFIN, 2001; IMF, 2002; World Bank, 
2002). 
The Rwandan poverty reduction strategy recognizes that growth is a prerequisite for long-run 
poverty reduction. The aim is to achieve real economic growth of about seven to eight per cent 
per year over the next 15 to 20 years. Rwanda's medium-term macroeconomic objectives are 
(i) to maintain the annual average inflation rate at three per cent, (ii) achieve annual real GDP 
growth of at least six per cent, and (iii) keep gross international reserves at least equal to six 
months of imports. Further, in the context of poverty reduction, the Rwandan ministry of 
finance is developing a macroeconomic model of the Rwandan economy. In the rest of this 
section we mention some of the other structural changes that are being made, based on the 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) under the auspices of the IMF, the World Bank and 
other donors. 
Other structural reforms include steps to improve the efficiency and productivity of the private 
sector, and to strengthen the effectiveness, comprehensiveness and accountability of those in 
control of public finances and promote greater supervision of the financial sector. In this 
regard, the domestic fiscal deficit is being kept within limits agreed upon under the PRSP. 
Substantial progress is also being achieved in the privatization of state owned enterprises. To 
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provide a boost to economic growth, Rwanda promotes economic openness by its membership 
of the Common Market of the Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Southern African 
Development Economic Countries (SADEC), and other regional and international economic 
organizations. 
Agriculture in Rwanda is mainly subsistence, characterized by smallholdings and low soil 
productivity due to over cultivation and poor use of modern inputs. Agricultural production is 
largely at the mercy of good weather. The objective of the poverty reduction strategy is to 
reduce by one half the number of people living below the poverty line. A huge task, that the 
government hopes to achieve by 2015. For these objectives to be achieved, the poverty 
reduction strategy has as its focus the diversification and the transformation of the agricultural 
sector (MINECOFIN, 2001; IMF, 2002; World Bank, 2002). Trade and financial reforms 
should help in this regard. 
The crucial role of the private sector as the engine of economic development of Rwanda has 
been made clear. Long-term policy objectives require the emergence of a healthy private 
sector that fosters economic growth. The promotion of the private sector in Rwanda is based 
on investment promotion, strengthening the financial sector, privatization and improving the 
legal environment (MINECOFIN, 2001; IMF, 2002; World Bank, 2002). 
Rwanda's external debt amounted to US$ 1.4 billion (85 per cent of the GDP) at the end of 
2003. Given the heavy debt service burden associated with this stock, Rwanda continues to 
negotiate the canceling and rescheduling of debt including arrears through the Paris Club 
Creditors and through other agreements. It is important to note that the Rwandan medium-term 
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strategy envisages a gradual reduction of macroeconomic imbalances and dependence on 
external grants and borrowing. Targeted improvements in domestic resource mobilization and 
the impact of the export promotion strategy, combined with prudent macroeconomic policies, 
will contribute to the realization of this shorter-term objective (IMF, 2004). 
Substantial progress has been achieved in making government finances more transparent. The 
Auditor General conducts audits of the operations of every central government ministry and of 
other public entities. Financial sector reforms continue with the NBR constantly increasing its 
efforts to establish compliance with prudential banking regulations on a regular basis, and 
auditing all commercial banks. Further, key recommendations of an IMF safeguards 
assessment for the improvements of the NBR's control, accounting, reporting and auditing 
systems have also been implemented. 
Other structural reforms undertaken include steps to improve the efficiency and the 
productivity of the private sector, and to strengthen, the effectiveness and comprehensiveness 
of public finances and to make improvements in regulating the financial sector. In this regard, 
substantial progress has been made with privatization, and important steps have been 
undertaken in addressing structural problems in the financial sector. Moreover, a new 
investment code has been established in order to create an attractive environment for capital 
investment. We now turn to the evolution of monetary policy in Rwanda. 
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3.3 The monetary policy adopted in Rwanda, before the implementation of the structural 
adjustment reforms 
Soon after its establishment in 1964, the NBR was required to organize all monetary matters in 
Rwanda. Thus it was required to support the realization of the social and economic objectives 
planned by the government. Indeed, the National Bank of Rwanda was regarded as being that 
entity able to guide the social and economic development undertaken in the country. In 
addition, it was also required to implement monetary policy in order to achieve particular 
macroeconomic objectives. In this context, and in order to make the banking system comply 
with the aims of the government, the National Bank of Rwanda decided, as was the case in 
almost every developing country, to control directly, the banking system. 
The central bank then, had to proceed, for this reason, to control the credit given by the banks 
to their customers. In addition, they had to determine the allocation of credit to the various 
economic sectors according to a scale of priority based primarily, on the strategic choices 
required by the government. Moreover, the NBR determined the level of interest rates in the 
economy. This monetary policy remained unchanged until the end of the 1980's. It is only at 
the beginning of the next decade, that the monetary policy started to take a new orientation, 
with the implementation in November 1990, of the first Structural Adjustment Program. For 
two and a half decades the NBR intervened in the macro economy using monetary policy. The 
NBR intervened by controlling both the demand and the supply of credit. 
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3.3.1 Control of the demand for credit by the National Bank of Rwanda 
In order to adjust the level of credit awarded by the banking system, and thus control the 
principal source of liquidity expansion, the NBR carried out, each time that it proved to be 
necessary, a change to the cost of credit. This action aimed to reduce the quantity of funds 
demanded. 
3.3.1.1 Modification of banks' conditions 
The general conditions applicable by the banks to their customers were defined, in an 
exhaustive way, by the NBR and their application was imposed on the whole of the banking 
sector. These conditions were applied with the view to achieve the economic goals of the 
government and were not always sound from a monetary policy perspective. The 
modifications in question were applied to the deposit and the lending rates of interest, as well 
as the commissions charged by the banks for their various services. 
3.3.1.2 Adjustment of the rediscount rate 
The interest rates applied by the central bank to the commercial banks, as regards rediscount 
was, on the one hand, an essential element of the structure of interest rates. Changing the 
interest rate would change the interest cost faced by the customers of commercial banks. In 
other words, the rediscount rate was a reference rate for the determination of interest rates in 
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the economy. The NBR adjusted the rediscount rate, each time it wanted to increase or 
decrease the liquidity in the economy. Various rediscount rates were thus applied, and 
differentiated, according to the nature of the operations initiated by the commercial banks 
concerned and depending on the sector that required refinancing. 
3.3.2 Control of the supply of credit by the National Bank of Rwanda 
Credit offered by commercial banks to their customers was conditioned, on the one hand, by 
the constraints on resources available to commercial banks. On the other hand, credit offered 
depended upon the possibility that the NBR would rediscount commercial bank securities. 
While influencing both the demand for, and the supply of credit in order to influence the 
behavior of the banks, and thus moderate their capacities for monetary creation, the NBR, 
devoted itself to credit control compatible with macroeconomic objectives. Commercial banks 
were regulated to prevent their hiding any financial intermediation not in accordance with the 
targets of credit control. 
3.3.2.1 Control of the level of commercial banks' free reserves 
By modifying the level of commercial banks' free reserves, the central bank influences their 
ability to satisfy their customers, and thus controlled their capacity for monetary creation. This 
action was the most essential part of the monetary policy in Rwanda, during the era of direct 
monetary policy intervention and was realized in the following manner. 
a. Reserve requirement ratios 
65 
In an attempt to exert control over the money supply progress, the NBR introduced reserve 
requirements in August 1990. By compelling commercial banks to keep unused a certain 
fraction of customers' deposits, the central bank sought to sterilize a part of banks' resources 
usually used in extending credit. Indeed, keeping the required reserves on deposits at the NBR 
restricted credit expansion and consequently monetary growth rates. This was not part of any 
structural adjustment programme, but may have been in anticipation of such changes. 
b. The rule of required credit allocation 
Within the framework of its selective policy as regards credit, the NBR imposed on banks, in 
October 1987, the requirement that a part of their resources must be used to provide credit to 
the following operations: 
(i) Government projects within the budget funded by the issue of treasury bills; 
(ii) Those that require medium and long-term credit; 
(iii) Acquisition of shares in companies operating in the financial sector. 
This selective method of credit allocation was also intended to limit the commercial banks 
ability to extend credit. 
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3.3.2.2 Credit Extension Ceilings 
Depending on the current economic situation and taking into account expected variations in 
banking reserves, the central bank determined, annually, a total amount they were willing to 
extend. This total amount was then allocated to each of the respective commercial banks. The 
individual allocation was determined by the commercial bank's main area of economic interest 
and their future expected lending and finance activities. 
At least three quarters of commercial banks' credit extension to the public was devoted to the 
financing of activities generating appreciable value added or contributing to those activities 
that reduced balance of payments' pressures. In the 1980's, commercial banks came under 
pressure to advance loans to their clients. Not having sufficient funds the commercial banks 
put pressure on the NBR. for additional reserves. As a consequence the NBR had to revise 
upwards the total amount it was willing to extend to commercial banks. 
However, some of the economic activities considered a priority by the government were 
financed in other ways. Theses activities include those likely: (i) to contribute to the 
realization of self-sufficiency in food production, (ii) to increase employment, (iii) to support 
the promotion of exports, (iv) to modernize the primary sector, in particular tea and coffee 
plantations, and mining production, (v) to support the promotion of international transport, and 
to stimulate housing construction. 
3.3.2.3 Thorough credit control 
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Motivated by a concern to supervise more closely monetary growth, the central bank made 
any credit extension by a commercial bank to its customers exceeding a certain amount subject 
to central bank authorization. Further, this authorization could not be interpreted as a right to 
increase the NBR's allocation at the discount window. This element of control made it 
possible to keep money supply growth within the constraints imposed by economic growth 
and keeping in mind that certain sectors of the economy were to be offered some priority 
status. In addition, credit control was likely to involve the central bank in the evaluation of the 
risk incurred by the banks concerned, and thus lead them to change their behavior and take 
into account the riskiness of their customers before making a loan. However, having said this, 
some activities, especially in agriculture did receive special support. 
3.3.2.4 Judicious control of financial intermediation 
Commercial banks had to contribute actively to the development of the economy, according to 
required standards, and without unfavorable effects on their financial status. Nevertheless, the 
demand for credit was quite large while financial resources available were relatively limited, 
and the banking system was hampered by a relative disability to carry out adequate financial 
analyses indispensable to the well functioning of their activities. It is in this constraining 
context that the NBR required the banking system, as from October 1987, to follow strict 
solvency requirements. Banks had to keep capital equal to 7 per cent of deposits if these 
deposits were greater than three billion Rwandan Francs. If deposits were lower, 10 per cent 
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of deposits had to be held in capital reserves. One problem that arose is that the NBR did not 
carry out inspections of commercial banks on a regular basis. 
3.3.3 Shortcomings and weaknesses of monetary policy before structural adjustment 
reforms 
As in some other countries, direct monetary policy proved to be inefficient in Rwanda. The 
use of money as a direct instrument led to the misallocation of available financial resources, 
and undermined financing conditions in the Rwandan economy. An unintended consequence 
of the NBR loan authorization process was that the commercial banking system did not do 
sufficient risk analysis. A reason for this was that the NBR seal of approval was taken by 
commercial banks to mean that risk considerations were minimal. Some inappropriate 
financing was made to companies just by virtue of being in economic sectors considered a 
priority by government. There was also evidence that some companies who did not meet the 
conditions for loans used undue influence on the authorities in order to obtain finance. 
Even if the central bank accepts the interest rate consistent with its money supply and 
monitors various commercial banks' commissions in order to avoid any kind of abuse, this 
policy generated perverse effects in Rwandan economy. Resources were allocated to 
inefficient uses, resulting in reduced savings, investment and growth as a result of excessive 
liquidity expansion. A major disadvantage of the monetary expansion via credit control was 
that the interest rate no longer was market determined and did not provide a signal as to the 
scarcity of capital in the economy. 
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3.4 The advent of the structural reforms in 1990 
Like a number of developing countries, Rwanda shifted from direct to indirect monetary 
policy in November 1990, as a result of implementing a Structural Adjustment policy imposed 
by the IMF and the World Bank. Direct control of prices and the money supply (and thus 
interest rates) were gradually abandoned to allow the determination of prices by market forces. 
Nevertheless the efforts undertaken with structural reforms in order to reduce the role of the 
government in the economy were soon suspended following the war that degenerated into 
genocide in April 1994. The reform process began again, to the extent it could, in 1995. This 
liberalization process made steady progress and thus monetary policy come to rely more and 
more on indirect instruments. 
3.4.1 The main financial reforms of the 1990's 
The financial sector liberalization undertaken in Rwanda during the 1990's had the following 
fundamental features: 
• Liberalization of banks' activities 
With effect from April 1992, the required preliminary authorization from the NBR before 
commercial banks could provide credit to their customers was abandoned. Banks' activities 
that were subjected to rules and regulations imposed by the NBR were removed. This new 
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situation conferred on banks a greater responsibility with regard to financial intermediation 
particularly in risk analysis. 
• Substitution of a priori financial intermediation control by a posteriori control 
With the abolition of the procedure of preliminary authorizations, control of the banks by the 
NBR fell into disuse and was substituted by a posteriori supervision carried out under the 
auspices of the NBR. These controls aimed at limiting banks' activities resulting in the misuse 
of resources or bank failure, which could compromise the existence of a well functioning 
banking system and thus affect the whole economy. 
• Market-based financing of the budget deficit 
In the context of economic and financial liberalization based on market forces, financing 
government activities by the NBR could not continue. In future, the government had to issue 
treasury bills and other negotiable securities in order to mobilize necessary domestic 
resources. As a result government would likely be more rigorous in its approval of 
expenditures. 
3.4.2 The indirect character of current monetary policy in Rwanda 
In the absence of a priori credit control, commercial banks were now able to award loans to 
their customers without the preliminary authorization of the NBR. Moreover, the rediscount 
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window was no longer as essential as in the past, since inter-bank lending, and the money 
market could provide the necessary funds provided they were dynamic enough to do so. In this 
context, monetary policy has to be conducted through indirect tools. 
Instead of being constraining, as was the case with direct monetary policy, the current indirect 
monetary policy achieves its goals by changing incentives. It aims at influencing the financing 
behavior of the banks keeping in mind the overall economic and financial objectives sought by 
the NBR. 
Nevertheless, the success of this new monetary policy remains reliant on the procedures (and 
their quality) used in forecasting money demand and commercial banks' liquidity. Other 
conditions required for the success of monetary policy are: (i) the reliability of economic data, 
(ii) and the methods of intervention used by the central bank in its management of commercial 
banks' free reserves in order to change the supply of money. 
3.4.2.1 Inflation targeting in Rwanda 
In 1998 the central bank was advised by its economic partners - the IMF and World Bank - to 
consider a medium term inflation target of three per cent a year as an ultimate objective. The 
NBR adjusts the M2 monetary aggregate via changes in the monetary base (currency plus 
reserves) to achieve its target for inflation. In the next chapter we examine empirically 
whether this is possible and find some evidence for it being feasible. 
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a. The ultimate objective of monetary policy 
In line with the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facilities (PRGF), the Rwandan monetary 
authority in collaboration with the IMF and other donors at large, decided on a medium-term 
inflation targeting of three per cent per annum. At the same time, nominal GDP growth rates 
were shown to be oscillating between five and six per cent per annum. Inflation targeting only 
works in an environment of no adverse supply shocks. These positive growth rates provide 
some justification for moving to a policy of inflation targeting. 
b. The intermediate objective 
As the inflation rate cannot be controlled directly, the NBR uses M2 as an intermediate 
instrument of control; the assumption being that if the intermediate monetary aggregate is 
controlled, then ipso facto, the inflation rate will be controlled. Thus, the realization of 
monetary stability depends on the NBR being able to change M2. Its choice of M2 is justified, 
not only by its ability to alter prices but, also, by the constraints that the NBR faces. 
In line with its policy of inflation targeting, the NBR attempts to maintain harmony between 
the supply and the demand for money, so as to keep the economy's liquidity at appropriate 
levels consistent with a stable inflation rate. To this end, the NBR uses a broad money variable 
M2 (the current state of the currency held by the public, plus the quasi money), for which 
reliable data is available each month. Thus it is a variable that the NBR can use, and change, 
in order to affect the level of prices in the economy. 
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In compiling this aggregate, the NBR conforms to the rules instituted by the IMF. In Table 3.1 
we show the levels of M2 broken down into its constituent parts. 
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In Table 3.1 it can be seen that M2 has been increasing over time except for the year 1998. M2 
increased by 6.6, 14.4, 9.5 and 12.3 per cent in 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002, respectively. In 
1998, M2 shrank 3.9 per cent; this decline was caused by a reduction in the autonomous 
factors, that is, mainly a fall in net foreign assets. Table 3.1 also reveals that, Ml is the 
principal component of M2; for instance, Ml was 61.5 per cent of M2 in 1997, and constituted 
76.9 per cent of the monetary stock in 2002. On the other hand, it is interesting to note that, 
currency was 32.8 and 40 per cent of money Ml in 1997 and 2002, respectively. There has 
been substantial growth in the quasi money. Indeed all the growth in M2 is from the last 
category. 
The NBR has in mind a forecast of GDP growth. Based on their models of M2 they know if 
the required (given GDP) levels of M2 are inconsistent with the targeted rate of inflation. 
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Having a single number as a target does add a constraint to monetary policy in that levels of 
M2 consistent with GDP growth may not be consistent with price levels. Thus other countries 
usually opt for a range of inflation. 
c. Operating target 
When monetary policy is managed with indirect instruments, the evolution of the monetary 
stock can only be followed in an indirect way through an operational objective, which is the 
monetary base. The latter is selected as the central bank is able to control currency and bank 
reserves (NBR, 2002). The NBR (NBR, 2002: 41) uses the following linear relationship 
between M2 and H (the monetary base): M2 — bH2, where b is the monetary base multiplier. 
The more stable the monetary base multiplier is, the more the central bank is able to control 
M2 through changes to the monetary base. Even the NBR admits that the required stability of 
the monetary multiplier is not always assured. However the NBR does monitor changes in M2 
on a daily basis and uses base money as an indicator of the future rate of growth of M2, and 
then the NBR uses its forecast of M2 to determine the nature and the range of its interventions 
in the money market. The difficulty the NBR faces is that it needs daily information on M2 yet 
this is only available on a monthly basis. It thus has to forecast M2 and uses the monetary 
base, which is available on a daily basis, and thus can be used to provide daily forecasts of 
M2. In Table 3.2 are some of the monetary indicators in Rwanda (for more economic and 
poverty indicators, see Appendices One and Two), for the years 1997 to 2001. 
2 Handa (2000) suggests that a simple linear relationship between M and B is given by M = ao + a^B , where 
M is the nominal value of the monetary aggregate, B is the nominal value of the monetary base, and a, is the 
marginal monetary base-money multiplier. He further argues that, the central bank can only control M through B 
if a0 and a, are stable. 
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Source: National Bank of Rwanda 
From Table 3.1 above it appears that, except for the year 1997 and 1998 where inflation rates 
were 11.7 per cent and 6.2 per cent respectively due to poor rainfalls and the massive return of 
Rwandan refugees, the inflation rate was kept around the targeted figure of three per cent in 
2000 (3.9 per cent) and in 2001 (3.4 per cent). Against the backdrop of these low inflation 
rates, real GDP growth rates of six per cent in 2000 and 6.3 per cent in 2001 were obtained. 
3.4.2.2 Procedures for controlling the monetary stock 
Although the NBR does not directly control the money supply, it does make forecasts of 
monetary aggregates on an annual basis. It also makes projections of bank liquidity on a 
weekly basis. These annual and weekly forecasts allow the NBR to provide sufficient currency 
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to meet the needs of the economy in terms of a means of payments. Basically, the annual 
forecast consists of envisaging, firstly, the sources of excess liquidity from: (i) net foreign 
assets, (ii) net claims on government, and (iii) the total credit provided by the banking system 
to the economy. To aid in this forecast use is made of other forecasts such as those for the 
balance of payments, the government deficit, the real economic growth and the rate of 
inflation. Armed with these forecasts, the NBR forecasts M2 which should respond to these 
factors. We find it strange that the NBR does not use an interest rate in the determination of 
M2. In Chapter Four, we attempt to correct for this shortcoming by estimating an equation that 
specifically includes an interest rate. 
This forecast of the annual monetary stock is then converted into monthly forecasts and 
updated from time to time. Weekly forecast of banking liquidity are based on the following 
factors that are likely to determine its evolution: (i) currency in the hands of the public, (ii) the 
net foreign exchange position at the NBR, and (iii) the government deficit. For a particular 
week, actual base money is compared with this forecast level and the gap dictates the direction 
of monetary policy. As long as weekly liquidity forecasts are consistent with monthly 
forecasts and ultimately annual monetary plans, open market operations can inject or mop up 
excessive liquidity from the economy. So the NBR adjusts liquidity levels according to the 
needs of economy but keeping in mind that over the longer-term, base money must be in line 
with annual forecasts. We now survey the various monetary policy instruments used to 
achieve monetary policy goals. 
3.4.2.3 Instruments of monetary policy in Rwanda 
In 1998 Rwanda implemented the so-called Poverty Reduction and Growth Facilities (PRGF). 
In this programme the NBR committed to a medium-term inflation target of three per cent per 
annum. In line with its current indirect monetary policy, the NBR uses monetary policy 
instruments to control commercial banks' free reserves to ensure that the supply of base 
money does not deviate from levels consistent with this inflation targeting. Moreover, the 
NBR can carry out specific interventions to inject or mop up excessive liquidity, in order to 
adjust the market interest rate if needs dictate. The indirect monetary instruments currently 
utilized by the NBR are: 
(i) Open-market operations; 
(ii) Discount window facilities; 
(iii) Reserve ratio requirements. 
We now proceed to discuss each of these in detail. 
a. Open-market operations, the inter-bank money market and other operations 
Instead of operating a direct lending mechanism for commercial banks, the NBR established a 
money market as part of its plan to achieve better control over the money supply. The NBR 
realized it would be better able to forecast and thus change monetary aggregates if banks 
borrowed or lent in a short-term liquidity market. In addition, monetary policy decisions were 
enhanced by the creation of a monetary policy committee that meets weekly, to assess the 
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stance of monetary policy and conditions in the foreign exchange market. So, this committee 
has to: 
(i) Undertake a retrospective analysis of the current monetary situation and 
determine how monetary policy has to adapt to any changes in the liquidity 
of the banking system; 
(ii) It also forecasts base money for next week, so as to determine the necessary 
intervention of the NBR in the money market in order to achieve its 
macroeconomic goals; 
(iii) Suggest any other actions the NBR might undertake to maintain control 
over the money supply and provide backing to continued bank supervision. 
Only approved commercial banks are allowed access to the emerging money market in 
Rwanda. The committee provides some oversight to ensure a smooth functioning of this 
market. We now examine some of the mechanisms the NBR has at its disposal to carry out 
open market operations. 
• Treasury bills 
The NBR is legally empowered to carry out the purchase and sale of treasury bills in order to 
undertake monetary policy. Treasury bills come in different maturities, namely 4, 13, 26 and 
even 52 weeks. These treasury bills do have a dual role in Rwandan economy. Not only can 
the NBR buy and sell these instruments but they are primarily issued by the government to 
finance its expenditure plans. In the past the government did monetise these debts, which led 
to inflationary pressures in the economy. The reforms under the structural adjustment 
programme attempted to stop this practice. If the NBR was no longer to acquire these bills, 
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then they could act as a means to mobilize private savings, provided the government does not 
change interest rates to such an extent that crowding out occurs, especially in those periods of 
reduced liquidity. By buying (or selling) these bills the NBR can change liquidity levels in 
economy and thus influence base money in line with the forecasts of money required to 
achieve the inflation target. While the NBR and the government must co-ordinate their 
activities, it must never be the case that the former be forced to acquire government debt. 
Treasury bills with enhanced features making for ease of negotiation have been introduced 
with the aim of creating a secondary market in these instruments. 
Treasury bills are auctioned every week and the auction is conducted by the NBR on behalf of 
the government. Each week the government has a certain borrowing requirement and 
commercial banks can bid for treasury bills issued by the government for this purpose. 
However, the NBR has in mind the level of the monetary aggregates for each week, so, the 
auction is conducted taking into account the borrowing requirement and the direction of 
monetary policy. As Musinguzi and Katarikawe (2001) point out, a central bank cannot 
control both the price and quantity of treasury bills. Thus, the NBR decides on the volume of 
treasury bills offered each week and leaves the market to determine their price and thus the 
interest rate. Non-financial companies and individuals can take part in the money market but 
their applications are submitted through commercial banks. 
• Other borrowings 
The NBR also sells or buys assets from the commercial banks to provide a reduce liquidity on 
a weekly basis. Exchanges of liquidity take place on a Monday and Friday with the 
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commercial banks indicating how much they wish to borrow or lend and the interest rate at 
which these transactions are to take place. The NBR then decides on the net flow of liquidity 
and announces the weighted average interest rate at which these exchanges took place. So the 
NBR does have a difficult task. It knows the level of liquidity consistent with its inflation 
target, yet each week that liquidity level can change as developments in the money market 
change. In addition, these other borrowings impact on the level of liquidity. So the NBR 
occasionally has to make specific interventions in the money market so as to mop up excessive 
liquidity or inject liquidity into the market to ensure consistency with its monetary policy. 
• The inter-bank market 
In 2000, an inter-bank market was established to encourage the exchange of liquidity between 
banks. The advantage of this is that banks do not seek accommodation at the NBR. This 
borrowing and lending does take place under strict conditions and collateral is provided. It is 
often observed that the interest rate in the inter-bank market is lower than other markets. 
Commercial banks are not limited to inter-bank market and can raise funds by issuing 
certificates of deposit. 
b. The discount window 
Banks that fail to satisfy their liquidity needs from the weekly money markets are given room 
to cover shortages through the discount window facilities at the NBR. Treasury bills or other 
eligible financial instruments serve as collateral for this borrowing at the NBR. Any amounts 
borrowed should not exceed 70 per cent of the market value of the collateral but this can be 
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extended to 90 per cent under certain conditions. The interest rate at the discount window is 
taken to be the four-week moving average of the inter-bank money market increased by a 
penal margin under the NBR's discretion. The following figure presents the different 
interventions made by the NBR in the money market from 1997 to 2001. 
Figure 3.2 The evolution of the Rwandan money market (1997-2001) in billion Rwandan 
Francs 
• Mop up 
• Injection 
• Discount Wind. 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Figure 3.2 shows that over the period 1997-2001, the NBR has intervened on the money 
market to inject, to mop up excessive liquidity or through discount window facilities in favor 
of commercial banks with shortages in funds. As the figure shows, in 1997, 1998 and 2001, 
the levels of liquidity were high which led the NBR to intervene accordingly and mop up 5.6, 
10.1 and 15.9 billion Rwandan Francs, respectively. However, as there are different needs for 
funds in the banking system, banks with deficits have recourse to the discount window. Figure 
3.1 reveals that use of the discount window facilities have been increasing over time; starting 
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c. Reserve requirements as an auxiliary monetary policy instrument 
Cash reserve requirements can affect banks' free reserves in the short-run and the supply of 
broad money in the long-run (Musinguzi and Katarikawe, 2001: 16). Primarily considered a 
prudential instrument to ensure that commercial banks keep sufficient funds on hand to meet 
any unexpected withdrawals by customers, cash reserve requirements are also one way the 
NBR can control base money. In fact, in the event of persistent imbalances in the liquidity in 
the economy, the central bank can carry out suitable adjustments to the reserve requirements 
ratio. Any increase indicates a tightening of the banking system's liquidity and, consequently, 
reduces commercial banks' ability to create money through lending to customers, while a 
reduction gives the opposite. Nevertheless, recourse to the use of this instrument should hardly 
be frequent; it should occur only when banking liquidity expands or narrows inordinately. This 
happens when there is an unusual surge in foreign currency receipts or when all commercial 
banks face liquidity problems. 
Recently, the reserve requirements changed as follows: 
(i) With effect from June 2002, the reserve requirements applied to cover foreign 
currency deposits; 
(ii) The reserve ratio on domestic currency and savings deposits has fluctuated in favor 
of commercial banks' in the last few years. It has varied from a high of 12 per cent 
in 1997 to Sper cent in 2001; 
(iii) In September 2001, the maintenance of and compliance with cash reserves was 
changed from a weekly requirement to a monthly commitment; 
(iv) Penalties for not meeting reserve requirements have been reduced. 
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In an era of developing indirect monetary policy instruments, it is argued that reserve 
requirements should not be used as a first option in the conduct of monetary policy because of 
its potential for inefficiency. Nevertheless, in Rwanda, we still see use of the reserve 
requirements partly because of an inherent weakness in the financial sector and because 
financial markets are not fully developed (Musinguzi and Katarikawe, 2001: 17)3. 
3.5 Persistent obstacles to the conduct of judicious monetary policy in Rwanda 
Monetary policy management in Rwanda faces a number of obstacles. An imperfect 
knowledge of economy is amplified by the inappropriate behavior of the principal partners 
(mainly commercial banks) of the NBR. Furthermore, the Rwandan financial sector is still 
underdeveloped and markets do not have high trading volumes. This section presents some of 
the obstacles facing monetary policy in Rwanda. 
The Rwandan financial sector is probably the least developed in Africa. It comprises the 
National Bank of Rwanda, six commercial banks (three of them were only established after 
1994) and three other non-bank financial institutions, only one development bank, and four 
insurance companies. The Rwandan financial sector is characterized by a low degree of 
monetization of the economy, and other structural deficiencies. 
3 Musinguzi, P. and Katarikawe, M. made a silimar assertion in 2001 in their paper "Monetary policy frameworks 
in Africa: the case of Uganda"; the latter is a neighboring country of Rwanda and both countries are currently 
implementing the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facilities (PRGF) under the auspices of the IMF. 
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There appears to be a general consensus that the conduct of monetary policy is facilitated by 
the existence of well-functioning markets, and that indirect monetary policy instruments 
contribute to deepening financial markets (Roe and Sowa, 1995; Ncube, 1997). On the one 
hand, the view is that fully developed markets serve as one of the channels of transmitting 
monetary policy, and on the other hand, the introduction of indirect monetary policy 
instruments helps markets to develop. Besides, most indirect monetary policy instruments are 
market-based, and thus markets need to work efficiently for policy to be effective (Musinguzi 
and Katarikawe, 2001: 22). As the Rwandan money market has been operational since 
September 1997, it is in an embryonic state. This explains the low volumes and the slow 
development of a secondary market in Rwanda. 
We saw in Section 3.4 that in an effort to encourage banks to lend among themselves rather 
than resorting to the NBR, an inter-bank money market was initiated in 2000. Unfortunately, 
banks prefer to lend their surplus funds to the NBR instead of other commercial banks in need 
of liquidity. Such a situation prevents the inter-bank money market from being very effective. 
In addition, the majority of commercial banks are reluctant to participate in long-term lending. 
Furthermore, some of the existing commercial banks prefer to hold most of their free reserves 
at the NBR, thus adding another constraint to monetary policy. 
Future real GDP growth in Rwanda is difficult to forecast. This is attributable to the Rwandan 
economy being largely informal, and to the fact that the relevant government departments do 
not have the necessary means to ensure a regular evaluation of overall production. In addition 
the available macroeconomic data, worked out by the Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Planning (MINECOFIN) lacks some required and reliable components making monetary 
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forecasts imprecise. Foreign currency inflows in favor of the government are so variable 
making it difficult to make accurate base money forecasts as part of sound monetary policy 
management. 
3.6 Conclusion 
Soon after its establishment in 1964, the National Bank of Rwanda (NBR) became responsible 
for organizing and supporting the realization of government social and economic policy. Thus, 
the conduct of monetary policy was subdued and subordinate to fiscal considerations. In this 
context the NBR devoted itself to direct monetary control, as was the case in almost all 
developing countries, thus maintaining the money supply at a level compatible with the 
government's macroeconomic objectives. Credit controls were achieved by rationing credit to 
commercial bank customers. Only after 1990 were commercial banks compelled to keep 
unused a certain fraction of the deposits of their customers, and the central bank sought to 
sterilize a part of bank resources usually used in making loans. Indeed, the fact of keeping 
required reserves at the NBR restricted credit expansion and consequently reduced monetary 
growth rates. Prior to reform, according to how the NBR saw the economic situation evolving, 
and taking into account the expected variation in banks' reserves, the central bank determined, 
annually, a total ceiling to the direct lending awarded to the commercial banks. Quotas, then, 
were established for each one of these institutions, corresponding to each bank's expected 
shortfall. The NBR had to determine at the end of each year, the limit of its funds that it would 
devote to commercial banks through rediscounts, during the following year. Furthermore, the 
central bank had to authorize any loan by a bank to customers exceeding a certain amount. 
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However, as in some other countries, direct monetary policy proved to be inefficient in 
Rwanda, and its prevalence led to disastrous consequences as resources were misallocated. 
Inefficiency in financial intermediation meant lower savings, investment and economic 
growth. 
Like a number of developing countries, Rwanda shifted from direct to indirect monetary 
policy starting in November 1990, as structural adjustments took effect. Indeed some changes 
were made in anticipation of these reforms. Direct control of prices and interest rates were 
gradually abandoned to allow for the determination of prices by market forces. Nevertheless, 
the efforts undertaken with structural reforms in order to reduce the role of the government in 
the economy were soon suspended following the war that degenerated into genocide in April 
1994. These policies were reactivated in 1995 after the war and genocide, and the 
liberalization process made steady progress. In this new environment monetary policy come to 
rely more and more on indirect instruments. 
In line with the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facilities (PRGF), which is currently being 
implemented, the Rwandan monetary authority in collaboration with the IMF and other 
donors, decided on a medium-term inflation target of three per cent a year. As inflation is a 
variable that the NBR cannot control directly, the central bank uses M2 as an intermediate 
instrument of control. The assumption being that if M2 is reduced, then inflation will fall. The 
next chapter examines to what extent this is possible. The monetary stock is changed by 
adjustments to the monetary base. The latter is selected as it is within the capacity of central 
bank control. The NBR bases its decision to change the monetary base both on long-term and 
short-term forecasts. Such forecasts enable the monetary authority to maintain monetary 
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balances at levels compatible with the real needs of the economy. Weekly liquidity forecasts, 
which are consistent with monthly forecasts and the annual monetary programme, now form 
the basis for the nature of open market operations carried out by the NBR. 
In line with its current indirect monetary policy, the NBR uses effective monetary policy 
instruments in order to control commercial banks' free reserves to ensure that the supply of 
base money does not deviate from desired levels. These indirect monetary instruments are: (i) 
open-market type operations, (ii) the discount window, and (iii) reserve ratio requirements. In 
August 1997, a money market was established to ensure greater control on base money. A 
weekly auction of treasury bills establishes a market interest rate known as the Bank rate. 
Treasury bills were introduced as a reform in order to limit the government monetising its debt 
that entailed fuelling inflationary pressures. The introduction of treasury bills was also meant 
to encourage private saving, although crowding out remains a possible problem. In addition, 
banks in need of liquidity can cover their shortages at the discount window of the NBR. An 
inter-bank money market has been operative in Rwanda since 2000, and banks can lend to one 
another, sometimes at rates below the Bank rate. 
The effectiveness of the Rwandan indirect monetary policy has been undermined by a number 
of factors: 
(i) Foreign currency flows are difficult to forecast and this affects all other forecasts, 
including base money that the NBR uses in its decision making. Money demand 
specifications should include exchange rate considerations. In the next chapter we 
estimate a money demand function without external links to establish a baseline 
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model. Future research would need to look at the impact of the foreign section on 
the baseline model, 
(ii) It is difficult to forecast real GDP growth given the informal nature of the Rwandan 
economy. Thus money supply changes are based on incorrect suppositions as to the 
nature of macroeconomic conditions, 
(iii) The Rwandan financial sector is still underdeveloped and financial markets do not 
have high trading volumes, 
(iv) The Rwandan money market, operational since September 1997 is still evolving. 
Only a few economic agents are involved, which explains the limited volume of 
money market activities, and this has meant the secondary market has been slow to 
develop, 
(v) Issues of trust between commercial banks hampers the working of the inter-bank 
money market. The full development of this market might be long in coming. 
This thesis attempts to begin dealing with some of these shortcomings by estimating a money 
demand function for Rwanda. To the best of our knowledge no such function has been 
published. If income forecasts are incorrect these should show up as odd elasticities in 
estimated functions. In addition, finding a stable money demand function without foreign or 
external effects may indicate the need to include these effects in future research. However, 
against this backdrop of the problems associated with monetary control in Rwanda, we feel 
that it is high time that an estimate of a base line money demand function be made. We do this 
in the next chapter and examine its features to ensure compatibility with current monetary 
policy and suggest possible amendments that can be made in any future research. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DATA ANALYSIS, TESTING, EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 Introduction to stability 
The main focus of this chapter is a quest for the stability of money demand in Rwanda. The 
model we formulated in Chapter Two to describe an econometric relationship should be 
constant over time and should be invariant to alterations in the distribution of the variables that 
make up the model (Charemza and Deadman, 1992). An econometric relationship is stable if 
the parameters in such a relation are not subject to permanent changes over time (Hoffman et 
ah, 1995). A stable money demand function is an essential part of planning and implementing 
the monetary policy (Beguna et ah, 2002). What is being sought in a stable money demand 
function is a set of necessary conditions for money to exert a predictable influence on the 
economy so that the central bank's control of the money supply can be a useful instrument of 
economic policy (Judd and Scadding, 1982). So, a stable demand for money describes the 
effectiveness of the monetary policy; it is an essential link in the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy (Laumas, 1978). 
Despite intensive analytical and empirical efforts, there is no general consensus concerning the 
empirical stability (or instability) of the money demand function (Andersen, 1985). Up to the 
1970's the money demand function was considered to be the one of the most stable and 
reliable in economics. Khan (1974), Laumas and Mehra (1976) and Laumas (1978) all found 
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stable money demand relationships. In contrast to these studies, Friedman and Kuttner (1992) 
and Miyao (1996) have argued against a stable US money demand. Judd and Scadding (1982) 
argues that prior to 1973, research conducted in the USA using post World war II data shows 
the existence of a stable money demand (Laidler, 1977 and Lucas, 1988); but post-1973 
studies provide evidence that the demand for money had become unstable in the US. Shifts in 
the demand for money were also experienced in other industrial countries in the 1970's, while 
results are mixed for developing countries (Sriram, 1999). Studies on M3 money demand in 
South Africa by Casteleijn (1999), Moll (1999), Moll (2000) and Van den Heever, (2001) 
assert that the relation between money, income and prices has become less stable in recent 
years. However, Nell (2003) provides empirical evidence of a constant and structurally stable 
M3 money demand function for South Africa over the period 1968-1997. One might ask the 
question "why do empirical results point in such different directions?" (Cyrusson, 2002). 
Cyrusson (2002) contends that there are two reasons for the diversity of results concerning 
stability: 
(i) Different studies cover different countries at different time periods; 
(ii) There are many different opinions about the specification of the money demand 
function. 
Laumas and Spencer (1980) argue that the specification of the demand for money function is 
of great significance for the outcome of the empirical tests. One reason for finding instability 
is that much of the empirical work uses the partial adjustment model as a specification for the 
money demand function (Beguna et al., 2002). Also, the particular regression technique that 
these studies use seems to affect the outcome. Papers written during the 1970's and the early 
1980's commonly use methods developed by Cochran-Orcutt, and Cooley-Prescott. More 
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recent papers use cointegration and error correction models as a standard tool for the analysis 
of the demand for money. Handa (2000) maintains there are two reasons for finding that 
money demand functions were no longer stable: first, there were many innovations concerning 
monetary variables and second, researchers brought even more sophisticated tools to bear on 
monetary variables. The attempts to find a stable money demand function have included: 
(i) Changes in the definitions of the monetary aggregate used as the dependent 
variable; 
(ii) The use of the current income as opposed to permanent income; 
(iii) The use of short-term interest rates, long-run interest rates, the rate of inflation, or a 
composite index of interest rates for the interest rate variable; 
(iv) Changes in the form of the estimating equation from linear to log-linear and semi-
log-linear. Some studies even use non-linear functions. 
There appears to have been a downward shift in the demand function in the US during the 
1970's and an upward shift during the 1980's; while in these decades, as in the 1990's, actual 
money holdings deviated remarkably from the predictions of most estimated money demand 
models (Handa, 2000). A stable money demand was found by Hendry and Ericsson (1991a) 
and Hendry (1995) for the UK, Muscatelli and Spinelli (2000) for Italy, and Baltensperger et 
al. (2001) for Switzerland. 
The Rwandan literature in the area of the stability of demand for money is virtually non-
existent. It is for this reason that we examine stability using Rwandan data. In 1998, Rwanda 
adopted an inflation targeting framework as part of its reforms of monetary policy. It is 
important to note however that, an official monetary framework of inflation targeting does not 
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necessarily rule out the importance of money in the formulation of an efficient monetary 
policy strategy, as long as there is a stable money demand function and the relevant monetary 
aggregate contains information about future price changes (Nell, 2003: 156). 
In the following sections, we first assess the stability of the money demand function in 
Rwanda using the M2 definition of money. Then, we determine whether money contains 
important information about future price changes and we test for weak and super exogeneity 
of income and prices through the M2 money demand function. The rest of the chapter is 
organized as follows. Section 4.2 deals with the model specification. Section 4.3 presents the 
plots of the data and reports the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test for the time series under 
study. In Section 4.4 we estimate the long-run money demand equation in Rwanda, using the 
modern approach of cointegration analysis. Section 4.5 utilizes the Error Correction 
Mechanism (ECM) to estimate the short-run money demand in Rwanda. In Section 4.6 we 
investigate whether there is a stable money demand in Rwanda. The last section summarizes 
the main empirical results and their policy implications, keeping in mind the two stated 
research hypotheses of this thesis. We confirm the first and find a stable money demand 
function in Rwanda. We also reject the second and find no causal link running from money to 
prices. 
4.2 Model specification 
In investigating the constancy and structural stability of money demand in Rwanda, we adopt 
the Nell (2003) specification. Nell (2003) examines the stability of M3 money demand and the 
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monetary growth targets in South Africa by applying Hendry's general-to-specific 
methodology (Hendry and Ericsson 1991b; Hendry 1995). Nell (2003) also follows Hendry 
and Ericsson (1991b) to test for weak and super exogeneity of money and prices through the 
M3 money demand function in order to determine whether money contains important 
information about future price changes in South Africa. We propose to do the same for 
Rwanda. Nell's equation to be estimated using Rwandan data is as follows: 
m-i, =P0+Pxyt+P1p'i+pi{RM-RO)t +ut (1) 
Where m3 denotes the demand for nominal M3 (for South Africa) money balances (which is 
currency plus demand deposits plus time deposits); y is real income proxied by real gross 
domestic product (GDP); pc is the price level proxied by the consumer price index (CPI); RM 
is the long-term opportunity cost of holding money proxied by the ten-year government bond 
yield and RO is the long-term own interest rate represented by a fixed deposit rate for twelve 
months. Lower case letters denote variables in natural logarithms (except for ut which is the 
error term). The determinants of the money demand specification in equation (1) are consistent 
with the theory presented in Chapter Two. Theory relates the quantity of money demanded to 
a small set of key variables linking money to the real sector of economy (Judd and Scadding, 
1982). Money demand theories suggests that the demand for money is a function of a scale 
variable as a measure of economic activity, and a set of opportunity cost variables to indicate 
the forgone earnings by holding assets which constitute alternatives to money (Sriram, 1999). 
The prior expectation of the parameters in our model is that /?, > 0, f32 > 0, /?3 < 0. As is 
mentioned earlier, real GDP is likely to affect money demand positively because as the 
economy produces more, the volume of transactions increases and demand for money 
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balances increases. The price level is also likely to influence money positively. The inflation 
rate in Rwanda is above zero, when prices go up the demand for money rises because people 
need more money to purchase the same amounts of goods and services. The interest rate 
differential is a measure of the opportunity cost of holding money. An increase in the 
differential raises the cost of holding money and thus decreases the demand for real balances. 
In equation (1) above, Nell (2003) proxies real income by real GDP following Mankiw and 
Summers (1986), who assert that real GDP is the most suitable scale variable for a broad 
definition of money. Nell (2003) uses the CPI and not the GDP deflator because, according to 
Muscatelli and Spinelli (2000), the CPI is likely to be a more important determinant of 
transaction balances. Further, the specification of equation (1) above is consistent with a 
theory of an interest rate differential (RM-RO), on condition that the coefficients of the two 
long-term interest rates are of equal magnitudes and opposite signs when they enter the 
equation independently (Nell, 2003: 157). In fact, the decision making process of M3 holders 
(in South Africa) is likely to be dictated by movements in long-term rates, because short-term 
rates are subject to a greater degree of variation (Goodhart and Crockett, 1970). This 
hypothesis seems to be consistent with the theoretical proposition of an interest rate 
differential, where M3 holders are not only interested in the long-term opportunity cost of 
holding money, but also the long-term own rate of return (Nell, 2003: 158). We are to apply 
this model to M2, which is the broad measure of money in Rwanda and comprises Ml (the 
sum of currency in the hands of the public and demand deposits in commercial banks) plus 
Quasi money (various time deposits). Therefore M2 is the relevant counterpart monetary 
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aggregate of the South African M34 definition of money (which is currency plus demand 
deposits plus time deposits). For RM, the opportunity cost, we use the twelve-month lending 
rate. For the own interest rate we use the twelve-month deposit rate, just like Nell (2003). We 
cannot use a long-term opportunity cost such as Nell's ten-year bond yield because Rwanda, 
like most developing countries, lacks the appropriate statistics. Instead of a bond yield we use 
a twelve-month lending rate. The assumption is that competition at the twelve-month term to 
maturity ensures similar movements in borrowing and lending rates. A second assumption we 
make in order to use this proxy is that changes in rates at lower terms to maturity follow 
changes to rates at higher terms to maturity. In other words we are saying a liquidity effect is 
operating along the yield curve. We assume an upward sloping yield curve and proxy the long-
term opportunity cost of holding money (RM) by the twelve month lending rate, which is 
higher than the deposit rate (RO) over the period of study. According to the term structure 
theory5, the yield curve can possess several different shapes. However, Handa (2000: 598) 
argues that the yield curve is normally upward sloping from left to right, with the yield rising 
with the term to maturity. 
The empirical analysis in this study makes use of quarterly time series data provided by the 
department of statistics of the National Bank of Rwanda. 
The formal definitions of money in South Africa are the following: Ml=notes and coins+cheque and 
transmission depositis+demand deposits; M2=M 1+short-term and medium-term deposits; and M3=M2+long-
term deposits (Nell, 2003: 177). 
5 "The term structure theory deals with the effect that time has on interest rate. It seeks to answer the question of 
why different maturities should have different yields" (Ephraim Clark, 2002: 476). 
The relationship between the short-term and the long-term interest rates is referred to as the term structure of 
interest rates (yield curve). The yield curve considers the relationship between the maturity and the yield at any 
given time, assuming all other factors are constant (Van Zyl et ah, 2003). 
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The data in question consists of 84 observations for the Consumer Price Index (CPI) from the 
first quarter in 1980 to the last quarter in 2000; 84 observations for real GDP (constant 1995 
prices) and 84 other observations for M2 (as well as 84 observations for each M2 money 
component, that is, Ml and Quasi money (see Appendix Three). Lending and deposit rates for 
this time period are also available from the above-mentioned source. The study is essentially 
econometric in nature and data testing is carried out using the econometric packages SPSS 
11.5 as well as the student version of EViews. 
4.3 Data analysis and checking variables for stationarity 
One of the important types of data used in empirical analysis is time series data. "A time series 
is a set of observations on the values that a variable takes at different times (Gujarati, 2003: 
25). This type of data poses several challenges to econometricians and to practitioners. Most 
empirical works based on time series data assume that the underlying time series is stationary. 
However, most economic time series are generally integrated of order one 1(1), that is, they 
generally become stationary only after taking their first differences. Loosely speaking, a time 
series is said to be stationary if its mean and variance do not vary systematically over time6 
(Gujarati, 2003). "Non-stationarity of time series has always been regarded as a problem in 
econometric analysis" (Charemza and Deadman, 1992: 124). Stationary time series are 
important because if a time series is non-stationary, we can study its behavior only for the time 
6 Such a time series is known as a weakly stationary, or second-order stationary process, or in a wide sense, 
stochastic process. A time series is strictly stationary if all the moments of its probability distribution and not just 
the first two (mean and variance) are invariant over time. If, however, the stationary process is normally 
distributed, the weakly stationary stochastic process is also strictly stationary, for the normal stochastic process is 
fully specified by its two moments: the mean and the variance (Gujarati, 2003). 
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period under consideration. Each set of time series data will therefore be for a particular 
episode. As a consequence, it is not possible to generalize from non-stationary data to other 
time periods. Therefore, for the purpose of forecasting, such non-stationary time series may be 
of little practical value (Gujarati, 2003). Moreover, if time series are non-stationary, one is 
likely to finish up with a model showing promising diagnostic test statistics even in the case 
where there is no sense in the regression analysis (Charemza and Deadman, 1992). The latter 
is the essence of what is known as the problem of spurious or nonsensical regression that can 
arise in studies using non-stationary time series. 
4.3.1 Checking variables for stationarity 
The previous section mentions the problems posed by regressions involving non-stationary 
time series. We now turn to find out if the time series in our data set are stationary. Although 
there are several tests of stationarity, we attempt only those that are prominently discussed in 
the literature namely, a graphical analysis, the correlogram test as well as the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test. 
4.3.1.1 Graphical analysis 
A visual plot of the data is usually the first step in the analysis of any time series. So, before 
one pursues formal tests to check variables for stationarity, it is advisable to plot the time 
series under study, which gives an initial impression about the likely nature of the time 
We now proceed with the plotting of the variables of our model. 
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Both m2 (which is the logarithm of nominal M2 money) in Figure 4.1 and p (the logarithm of 
the CPI) in Figure 4.2 are trending upwards, albeit with fluctuations especially in 1994. 
Following the war and the Rwandan genocide in 1994, prices (the CPI) have increased in 1995 
and became more than double its level in 1993. In Figure 4.3, the logarithm of real GPD trends 
downwards until 1994 when it starts becoming fairly horizontal. In Chapter Two we noted that 
real GDP fell by almost a half in 1994. This is evident in Figure 4.3. The interest rate 
differential in Figure 4.4 does not display any particular trend, as it is fairly variable. Figure 
4.4 shows also that the interest rates, RJVI and RO, share the same trend, which suggests that 
they might have a long-run relationship. We discuss these long-run relationships in Section 4.4 
below. A look at the graphs of the above plotted time series (especially for m2, p and y) gives 
the impression that they are not stationary time series because visually at least the mean and 
variance of the individual series do not seem to be time invariant. Gujarati (2000) points out 
that these intuitive visual examinations are the starting point of any analysis. We now consider 
more formal tests of stationarity. 
4.3.1.2 Sample correlogram 
The Sample Autocorrelation Function (SACF) at lag k denoted as pk, is defined as the ratio 
of the sample covariance (at lag k) to the sample variance. The sample correlogram is a plot of 
the sample autocorrelation function (SACF) against k (the lag length when computing the 
SACF). If a particular time series is stationary, the autocorrelation coefficients at various lags 
hover around zero or decline very quickly. For a non-stationary time series, the autocorrelation 
coefficient starts at a very high value and declines very slowly towards zero 
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Figure 4.9 Correlogram of RO 
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As it appears from the correlograms of m2, y, p, RM and RO, their autocorrelation coefficients 
start at very high values (close to one) and taper off slowly toward zero as the lag lengthens 
leading as to the conclusion that all these time series are non-stationary. The pattern shown by 
the correlogram of (RM-RO) is different from the other variables. The autocorrelation function 
starts at a very low value of 0.5 (unlike for the other correlograms where it was close to one) 
and declines quickly to hover around zero. Thus, we can conclude that RM-RO is a stationary 
time series. 
4.3.1.3 The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test 
Before any sensible regression analysis can be performed, it is essential to identify the order of 
integration of each variable - provided that the variables under consideration can be made 
stationary through differencing (Charemza and Deadman, 1992). In general, a time series in 
said to be integrated of order d, denoted 1(d), if it has to be differenced d times to become 
stationary. Thus, stationary time series do not require any differencing, they are said to be 
integrated of order zero, 1(0). Unit root tests are designed to test the order of integration of a 
variable (Darnell, 1994). An appropriate method of testing the order of integration has been 
proposed by Dickey and Fuller (1979). The Dickey-Fuller (DF) test is based on the regression 
of the following equation7: 
AYt={p-\)Yt_x+st=5Yt_x+ut (2) 
7 The DF test is estimated in three variants (random walk, random walk with drift, and random walk with drift 
around a deterministic trend) namely: AYt = 5Yt_x + ut, or AYt = (5X + 5Yt_x + ut, or 
AYt=px+(32t + 5Yt_x+ut. 
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Where - 1 < p < 1, and ut is assumed to represent a series of white noise error term. The 
Dickey-Fuller test consists of testing the null hypothesis that 8 = 0 in equation (2). If 8 - 0, 
then p = 1, that is we have a unit root, meaning the time series under consideration is non-
stationary. But if 8 < 0, this implies that p < 1, we conclude that there is no unit root, and the 
time series in question is stationary. Dickey and Fuller have shown that under the null 
hypothesis that 8 = 0 (or p = 1), the estimated t value of the coefficient of Yt_x in equation (2) 
follows the T (tau) statistic. A weakness of the original Dickey-Fuller test is that it assumes 
that the error terms ut in equation (2) are uncorrelated. But in case the ut are autocorrelated 
(that is, ut is not white noise) then the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of equation (2) 
are not efficient. A solution advocated by Dickey and Fuller (1981) and known as the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is to use the lagged values of the dependent variable 
AYt as additional explanatory variables to approximate the autocorrelation. The ADF 
equivalent of (2) is the following8: 
AY^SY^+a^AY^+e, (3) 
where s, is a pure white noise error term. The practical rule for establishing the value oik (the 
number of lags for AYt_,) is that it should be relatively small in order to save degrees of 
freedom, but large enough so that the error term in (3) is serially uncorrelated (Charemza and 
Deadman, 1992). The ADF test follows the r (tau) statistic and we still test whether 8 = 0 . If 
the estimated r value is less than the critical value of r , in absolute terms, then we accept the 
k 
8 The ADF test is also estimated in three different form namely: AYt — 8Y^X + ai V^ AYt_t + St or 
k k 
AY, =/?, + ^ _ , +a,£A7,_, +e, ,or AY, =/?, +J32t + 8Y,_, +a , |>7 ,_ , . +s, . 
M 1=1 
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null hypothesis that 8 = 0 (that is, p = 1), and there is a unit root, in which case the time 
series is non-stationary. On the other hand, if the estimated r value is greater that the critical 
value of z , in absolute terms, we reject the null hypothesis that 8 - 0, in which case p < 1, 
and this implies that there is no unit root, which leads to the conclusion that the time series 
under consideration is stationary. The ADF test is widely regarded as being the most efficient 
test from among the simple tests for integration and is at present the most widely used in 
practice. Thus, we apply the ADF test to formally test the order of integration of the variables 
in our model. Table 4.1 below reports the ADF test results. The second column lists the 
estimated ADF r values for the variables in level form (and in logarithms for variables in 
lower case), while the last column gives z values for variables in their first differences. 
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Notes: (1) The 99 per cent critical value of Dickey-Fuller (with constant) is -3.51 and 
the 95 per cent value is -2.89 (our sample is made of 84 observations). 
(2) The 99 per cent critical value of Dickey-Fuller (with constant and trend) is 
-4.04 and the 95 per cent value is -3.45. 
(3) The ADF tests are of order one and contain intercepts and no trends (except 
for m2 whose ADF contains an intercept and trend). 
(4) *** denotes significance at the one per cent level. 
(5) Recall that "the ADF test adjusts the DF test to take care of possible serial 
correlation in the error terms of the regressand"(Gujarati, 2003). 
The second column, ADF test (r), in Table 4.1 shows that except for the variable (RM-RO), 
the computed r statistics, in absolute value, are less than the 99 per cent critical value of 
Dickey-Fuller which is -3.51 and even less than the 95 per cent critical r which is equal to -
2.89. This implies that we accept the null hypothesis that 8 = 0 (that is, p = 1), and there is a 
unit root; the time series in question are not stationary. Therefore, on the basis of graphical 
analysis, the correlogram, and the ADF test, the conclusion is that for the quarterly periods of 
1980 to 2000, m2, y, p, RM, and RO are non-stationary. 
Unit root tests are often used as preliminary cointegration tests. If two series are individually 
1(1) but the difference between them is 1(0), the two series cointegrate with a unit coefficient. 
However, if the difference between the two 1(1) series is also 1(1), the two series could still be 
cointegrated, but with a non-unit coefficient (Nell, 2003). Thus, the last two rows in Table 4.1 
present preliminary cointegration tests. In the penultimate row of Table 4.1, the interest rate 
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differential (RM-RO) is 1(0) leading to the conclusion that the two interest rate series (RM and 
RO) cointegrate with a unit coefficient. The last row in Table 4.1 indicates that m2 deflated by 
consumer prices (m2 - p) is 1(1) suggesting that the M2 money demand function may not be 
homogeneous of degree one in the level of prices. The relation between M2 and prices might 
be very close to proportionate, but Hendry (1995) warns against imposing restrictions that may 
affect short-run dynamics. Many studies include the inflation rate as an additional variable. 
This can cause difficulties if the two series are not stationary. Real money and inflation could 
move together only because of price movements (Nell, 2003). We do not adopt this approach. 
The fourth column (the last one) in Table 4.1 shows that all the considered variables become 
stationary in their first differences. This is conformed by a plot of the first difference of the 
variables mentioned above (see Figure 4.11 below). 
YEAR 
Figure 4.11 Fisrt difference of m2, y, p, RM and RO 
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In comparison with the plots of the original variables (see Figure 4.1 to Figure 4.4), the plots 
of the transformed time series does not display any trend and seem to be constant in their 
mean, variance and covariance. Therefore, since the represented time series originally are not 
stationary, but becomes stationary in their first differences, they are integrated of order one 
1(1)-
4.3.1.4 The income velocity of money 
Before we proceed, we briefly present the velocity of money in Rwanda. The earliest 
empirical works on money demand primarily involved producing an analysis of velocity, 
characterizing its behavior over time and identifying the institutional factors responsible for 
long-run movements in velocity. Velocity is defined as the ratio of income to the money 
supply (PQ/M) and is interpreted as the number of times the money stock turns over per year 
in supporting financially the production of output (Kennedy, 2001). Figure 4.12 presents the 






1980 .' .' .' 1985 .' .' .' 1990 .' .' .' 1995 .' .' .' 2000 
YEAR 
Figure 4.12 The income velocity of M2 money and its sub-compontents(lns) 
The graph shows that VMl the logarithm of the income velocity of Ml (currency plus demand 
deposit), VQM the logarithm of the income velocity of quasi money (various term deposits), 
and VM2 the logarithm of the income velocity of M2 (Ml plus quasi money) seem all to be 
trending downward despite the broken trends in 1994 during the Rwandan war and genocide. 
This decreasing velocity might be caused by the growing demand for money. The plots 
suggest that the trend in M2 is influenced by the behavior of its sub-components VQM and 
VMl. Another feature that is worth mentioning is that, even if VM2 is trending downward, 
the plot shows that it has remained stable around its trend (albeit with the broken trend in 
1994) despite the financial reforms implemented during the 1990's in Rwanda. 
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4.4 Cointegration and long-run money demand estimates 
We caution in Section 4.3 above that a regression of a non-stationary time series on another 
non-stationary time series might produce a spurious regression. However, if the residuals from 
the latter regression are subjected to a test of stationarity (say the unit root test) and found to 
be stationary, this regression will be meaningful (not spurious). In this case, the variables in 
question are said to be cointegrated. Economically speaking, two variables (or more) are said 
to be cointegrated if there is a long-run or equilibrium relationship between them (Charemza 
and Deadman, 1992; Gujarati, 2003). Therefore, as Granger (1986: 226) puts it, a test for 
cointegration can be thought of as a pre-test to avoid spurious regressions situations. Table 4.1 
indicates that except for the interest rate differential (RM-RO), the variables in our model (m2, 
y, p, RM, and RO) are individually 1(1). So, in order to avoid the problem of spurious 
regression, we ought to subject the residuals of our model to unit root test to find out whether 
our selected variables cointegrate and determine whether there is a long-run relationship 
between them. 
Our long-run model consists in regressing m2 on y and p. The interest rate differential (RM-
RO) will not be included in our long-run specification. Following Nell (2003), since the ADF 
unit root test (in Table 4.1) shows that RM and RO cointegrate with a unit coefficient (because 
(RM-RO) is 1(0)), in other words, there are two cointegrating vectors in the money demand 
function when the interest rates enter independently. The net long-run interest rate effect is 
therefore zero, because a positive shock to RM will be equally offset by an increase in RO, that 
is, in the long-run, RM=RO. If the interest rate effect is immediately entered as a differential 
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(RM-RO) the long-run impact is zero. The cointegrating regression results for our model are 
given below, with ^-statistics in parentheses. 
m2 = -1.064 + 0.596y + 1.592p (4) 
(-1.269) (7.927) (18.916) 
R2= 0.958 adjusted/?2 =0.957 d = 0.308 F = 926.7 
According to the extremely high F-test, the model is significant. The computed ^-statistics (for 
y and/?) are highly statistically significant, the adjusted R1 is high, but the Durbin-Watson d 
value is extremely low indicating that the model is plagued by the problem of autocorrelation. 
We know from Gujarati (2003: 792) that, sometimes autocorrelation results because the 
underlying time series is non-stationary. However, according to Granger and Newbold (1974), 
an R2> d is a good rule of thumb to suspect that the estimated regression is spurious. 
Moreover, since m2, y, and p are individually non-stationary, there is a possibility that our 
regression of m2 on y and p in equation (4) is spurious. Therefore, to find whether the 
regression (4) is not spurious, we performed a unit root test on the residuals estimated from (4) 
to check whether m2, y and p cointegrate, in other words, we performed the Engle-Granger 
test as follows. 
Aw< = -0.151w,_, 
t = (-2.515) 
adjusted R2= 0.060 d= 1.809 
The Engle-Granger 5 per cent critical t value is -1.95. Since the computedr value (-2.515) is 
greater, in absolute value, than the critical Engle-Granger, we reject the null hypothesis 
(S = 0) that we have a unit root. The residuals from our regression are 1(0) or stationary. 
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Hence, m2, y and p are cointegrated, and equation (4) represents the long-run money demand 
in Rwanda. Compared to Nell's results we note that prices adjust less than the change in the 
money supply. 
Nell (2003) contends that the cointegration test in equation (4) has to be taken as an initial 
estimation because it prevents difficulties associated with other cointegration procedures. 
Moreover, Inder (1993) demonstrates that excluding dynamics in finite samples may affect the 
performance of the estimator and as an alternative suggests the Unrestricted Error Correction 
Model (UECM), which should reduce bias and also includes dynamics in the estimation of the 
long-run model. We specified our UECM of order two as follows: 
i=l z'=0 (=0 (=0 
+ 56D2+ S7t + axmlt_x + a2 v,_, + oc3pt_] + a4 (RM - RO)l_l + et (5) 
In equation (5), the variables have the same definition as before except for the dummy variable 
Z), that takes the value of one in 1994ql-1995q4 and zero otherwise, and D2 which takes the 
value of one in 1990ql-2000q4 and zero otherwise, whereas Ms a time trend. Nell (2003) 
insists on the inclusion of dummy variables, and even outlier dummies, since one cannot easily 
detect outliers on visual displays of the economic data. The omission of relevant dummies 
may lead to predictive failure, because the Error Correction Model still converges to the old 
equilibrium (Clement and Hendry, 1997). Our dummy variable Dx captures the dramatic price 
increase in 1994-1995 following the Rwandan war and genocide, and we expect its coefficient 
to have a negative sign. D2 captures the structural adjustment reforms that were implemented 
in Rwanda since 1990. Variables in level form such as (m2r_,) represent the long-run part of 
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the model, while those in differences such as (Ay,_,) stand for the short-run. For our 
parsimonious specification, we have decided to eliminate all other insignificant parameters 
from the model except for the coefficient of the change in the short-run interest rate 
differential A(RM - RO). The results of the regression for equation (5) are presented below, 
with ^-statistics in parentheses. 
Aw2 = 0.994 + 0.297 Ay,_, + 0.86 Ap + 0.001 A(RM - RO) - 0.063 D2 + 0.005^ 
(1.49) (3.11) (3.71) (0.16) (-2.31) (2.93) 
-0.319/w2,_, +0.121 y,_t +0.289 /?,_, (6) 
(-3.79) (2.12) (2.81) 
The insignificance of (a4) the coefficient of (RM - RO)t_^ in equation (6) suggests that (RM-
RO) has no long-run effect. This is in line with Nell's (2003) assertion that when the unit root 
test shows that the RM and RO cointegrate with a unit coefficient, the long-run impact of the 
interest rate differential (RM-RO) is zero. The salient feature of equation (6) is the statistical 
insignificance of the coefficients for all lagged changes in (RM-RO). Despite having this, we 
kept A(RM-RO) in our model because the theory suggests that the demand for money is a 
function of a scale variable and a set of opportunity cost variables to indicate the forgone 
earnings by not holding assets, which are alternatives to, money. The opportunity cost of 
holding money involves two ingredients: the own rate of money and the rate of return on 
assets alternatives to money (Sriram, 1999). In equation (6), the cointegration test is based on 
the coefficient of mlt_x (the error correction coefficient)
9. The computed r value of the latter 
9 Tests of cointegration based not directly on the residuals but on the regression coefficients themselves, might 
have higher power (Banerjee et al., 1993) 
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is equal to -3.79 which in absolute value is greater than the 5 per cent Dickey-Fuller critical 
r of-3.45, leading to the rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration. The existence of 
cointegration is also supported by the plot of the residuals from equation (6) in Figure 4.13 
below, as well as a unit root test conducted on the same residuals. 
1980 . . 1985 . . 1990 . . 1995 . . 2000 
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Figure 4.13 Residuals from the UECM in equation (6) 
It is apparent from Figure 4.13 above, which is a plot of the residuals from the regression of 
equation (6), and their frequent crossing of zero, that our UECM is a cointegrating regression. 
Therefore, m2, y, and p have a long-run relation between them. We derived the long-run 
solution of equation (6) by taking the ratio of the coefficients of the level variables ( yt_x and 
pt_x) to the error correction coefficient of 0.319. This gives us the following equation: 
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There are however differences between the magnitude of the coefficients in equation (4) when 
compared to equation (7). We now note that in this second estimation, which includes the 
short-run dynamics, that prices adjust by more than the money supply. As noted in Chapter 
Two, money is not superneutral. 
4.5 Short-run dynamic Error Correction Model 
Error Correction Models (ECM) have proved to be one of the most successful tools in applied 
money demand research (Sriram, 1999). The ECM contains information on both the short and 
the long-run properties of the model with disequilibrium as a process of adjustment to the 
long-run model. When cointegration holds, and if there is any shock that causes 
disequilibrium, there exists a well defined short-term dynamic adjustment process, the error 
correction mechanism, that will push back the system toward the long-run equilibrium. In fact, 
cointegration implies the existence of a dynamic error correction form relating to the variables 
in question (Engle and Granger, 1987). As ECM's have demonstrated their ability to 
incorporate the difficult empirical issues of equilibrium in modeling and estimating money 
demand, and given their widespread implication, they have attracted significant research 
interest among economists from around the world. Arize and Schwiff (1993) summarize the 
desirable properties of the ECM as follows: 
(i) The ECM avoids the possibility of spurious correlation among strongly trended 
variables; 
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(ii) The long-run relationships that may be lost by expressing the data in differences to 
achieve stationarity are captured by including the lagged levels of variables on the 
right-hand side; 
(iii) The specification attempts to distinguish between short-run and long-run effects; 
(iv) The ECM provides a more general lag structure, which does not impose many 
restrictions on the model (Hendry, 1979). 
Equation (6) above represents the ECM for our data. However, in order to obtain an equation 
that shows the equilibrium adjustment, the long-run portion of equation (6) is changed to the 
equilibrium error, or ml + J.064 - 0.596y - 1.592p following Nell (2003). Then, this error 
term can be used to tie the short-run behavior of money demand to its long-run value. The 
results for this ECM are presented below, with ^-statistics in parentheses: 
Am2 = 0.01 + 0.316Ay,_, + 0.936Ap - 0.0003A(/?M - RO)- 0.12ecm,_, 
(1.53) (3.5) (5.05) (0.05) (-2.41) (8) 
As these results show, the coefficient of the equilibrium error term (ecmt_x) is negative, and 
statistically significantly different from zero implying that 0.12 of the discrepancy between 
money demand, income, and price in the previous quarter is eliminated in the following 
quarter. Therefore, the speed of adjustment for money demand in Rwanda is equal to 0.12, 
which is considered to be low, indicating the slow adjustment of the amount of money 
demanded toward its long-run equilibrium value. Only 12 per cent of the deviation is 
corrected, suggesting that the Rwandan money market needs about two years to re-adjust to 
equilibrium. It is of some interest that the correlogram for the interest rate differential (Figure 
4.10) also goes to zero after two years. Note that the interest rate differential in (8) above, 
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which we kept in the model on theoretical grounds has once again yielded an insignificant 
coefficient. Equation (8) has the coefficients for Ay(_, and Ap showing larger magnitudes 
than in (6) but for most purposes they are the same. Moreover, standard errors were found to 
be slightly lower in equation (8) because: 
(i) There is an increase of degrees of freedom in (8) that was gained because the long-
run part of equation (6) was transformed to yield the equilibrium error and also the 
insignificant variables were dropped; 
(ii) Equation (8) captures both short and long-run effects. 
Figure 4.14 below records the actual and fitted values of equation (8) as well as the plot of the 
residuals. 
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Figure 4.14 Actual, fitted values, and residuals of equation (8) 
An examination of this figure confirms that equation (8) fits the actual data very well, and the 
residuals from the regression in equation (8) appear to be stationary. Indeed the model fits the 
data for years of the war and genocide rather well. 
4.6 Testing for stability of the money demand function 
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The question of whether the demand function for money is stable is one of the most important 
recurring issues in the theory and application of macroeconomic policy (Judd and Scadding, 
1982). A stable money demand function is at the core of the conduct of monetary policy as it 
enables a policy-driven change in monetary aggregates to have a predictable influence on 
output, interest rates, and ultimately prices (Sriram, 1999). Recall that an econometric 
relationship is stable if the parameters in such a relation are not subject to permanent changes 
over time (Laumas and Mehra, 1976). What is being sought in a stable demand function is a 
set of necessary conditions for money to exert a predictable influence on the economy so that 
the central bank's control of the money supply can be a useful instrument of economic policy 
(Judd and Scadding, 1982). Section 4.1 above gives an account of the various issues 
concerning the study of money demand functions in different countries. In this section, the key 
issue is to test whether there exists a stable money demand in Rwanda for the period 1980-
2000 using quarterly data. Gujarati (2003) contends that when we use a regression model 
involving time series data, it may be that there is a structural change in the relationship 
between the regressand and the regressors. By structural change, we mean that the values of 
the parameters of the model do not remain the same through the entire time period. Our 
sample period includes a certain number of events that potentially could cause structural 
changes, namely, the financial reforms dictated by the Bretton-Woods institutions since 1990, 
and the genocide of 1994, which then resulted in high rates of inflation. There are several 
methods to test for structural stability. We have opted for three relevant tools suggested by 
Charemza and Deadman (1992) for such an inquiry, namely, the plots of the recursive least 
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squares coefficients, the one-step residuals, and the scaled recursive Chow test statistics. We 
now discuss each of these tests in greater detail. 
4.6.1 Recursive Least Squares (RLS) Coefficients 
In this test, the interest is on the behavior of the parameters of the model over time. The test 
consists of starting from a small sub sample of t = 1, 2, 3,..., n, where n >k, and using this 
sub-sample we estimate the k parameters of the model by OLS. Then one extends the sample 
period by one observation to t = 1, 2, 3,..., «+l, and re-estimates the model . We then 
continue this procedure until the estimation period is the complete sample t = 1, 2, 3,..., T. In 
other words, the vector of the estimated coefficients is computed sequentially for t = n, then / 
= n+\, up to t = T, by rolling forward the data admitted to the sample one period at a time. 
Hence, these least squares estimates are termed the recursive least squares coefficients 
(Charemza and Deadman, 1992). Then, in order to obtain the time path of the coefficients in 
the model, the values of each recursively estimated coefficient is plotted against time. Plots of 
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Figure 4.15 Recursive least squares coefficients of the ECM (equation (8)) 
It appears from the time paths of the recursively estimated coefficients presented in these 
figures, that all the parameters of our error correction model remained stable over our period 
of study. Charemza and Deadman (1992) argue that the instability that is observed at 
beginning of the plots of the parameter estimates simply reflects the small number of the 
observations used to estimate them at the start of the recursions. Note that the last panel in 
Figure 4.15 plots the recursively estimated error correction coefficient, which appears to be 
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constant and very close to the value of-0.12 computed in equation (8). This is fairly strong 
evidence that money demand in Rwanda is stable. 
4.6.2 One-Step Recursive Residuals 
A plot of the one-step residuals provides another guide to parameter constancy in a model. In 
fact, when we are computing the recursive least squares coefficients, at each recursion an OLS 
residual for the last period in the sample can be obtained. Then, from the set of such last 
period residuals available at time t, their standard error crt is computed and helps to determine 
error bands of ± 2 at around zero. At any break point a residual is likely to appear abnormal, 
compared with the other residuals, when it lies outside the error bands of ± 2 at (Charemza 
and Deadman, 1992). Figure 4.16 below presents the one-step residuals of our ECM. 
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Figure 4.16 One-step recursive residuals of our ECM 
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It is seen from Figure 4.16 above, that all the one-step recursive residuals lie within the error 
A 
bands of ± 2 <jt , also suggesting that our model has not undergone any structural changes over 
the period sample, although the early nineties and the single year 1997 show near instability. 
Again it is 1995 that is remarkable for its stability. 
4.6.3 Scaled Recursive Chow Test 
Unlike the Chow test, which assumes the point of structural breaks to be known, the scaled 
recursive Chow test helps to detect unknown possible structural breaks. Following Charemza 
and Deadman (1992), if the residual sum of squares for the model fitted by OLS up to and 
including period t-\ is RSS , and if the corresponding residual sum of squares for the model 
fitted up to and including period t is RSS*, then the Chow test statistic is computed as: 
(RSS*-RSS) 
Ch°W>= RSS/ / 
/(t-k) 
Under the null hypothesis that there has been no structural break in the model between periods 
t-\ and t, the above statistic has an F distribution with 1 and t-k degrees of freedom. The F 
statistic computed for each recursion is then divided by its 5 per cent critical value from the 
tables of F, which yields a scaled recursive Chow test for each recursion as follows: 
Chow, 
F0,s(U~k) 
Under the null hypothesis of no structural break, the plot of the scaled recursive Chow test 
statistic should be less than unity. Therefore, values of the scaled recursive Chow test that are 
greater than one imply that the null of no structural change between periods t-\ and / has to be 
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rejected at the 5 per cent level of significance. In other words, there has been a structural 
break. We first obtain the recursive Chow statistics then divide them by their 5 per cent 
critical F value from tables which yields the scaled recursive Chow statistics. The following 
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Figure 4.17 Scaled recursive CHOW test 
In can be seen from Figure 4.17 that there is no value of the scaled recursive Chow that is 
greater that unity, all the values lie under unity implying that the null hypothesis of no 
structural change has to be accepted at the 5 per cent level of significance. Therefore, on the 
basis of all the tests performed, namely, the recursive least squares coefficients, the one-step 
recursive residuals, and the scaled recursive Chow test, all these visual displays strongly 
suggest that equation (8) is stable over time. Following Nell (2003), the constancy of equation 










but also the long-run part, since the long-run relation is captured by the error correction 
coefficient in equation (8). 
4.6.4 Tests for exogeneity 
We now test for super exogeneity of y and/?. Hendry (1995) argues that a variable is said to be 
super exogenous for the parameters of interest if it is weakly exogenous for the parameters of 
interest, and if it is also invariant to changes in the parameters of the marginal model. The lack 
of structural invariance is usually a sad message to a policy analyst (Charemza and Deadman, 
1992: 270). In other words, if a model intended for policy use is structurally invariant, the 
estimated parameters of the model in question can safely be used in a policy simulation 
experiment. If however the model is found to be not structural invariant, no knowledge can be 
retrieved from the considered sample relevant to the parameters of interest. Therefore, in our 
case, if equation (8) is to be used for policy purposes we must ensure that for a given change 
in the money supply, the coefficients of the exogenous variables are invariant with respect to 
the policy change. This section uses an indirect test - weak exogeneity - to determine that the 
coefficients do not change as policy decisions change. 
We followed Charemza and Deadman (1992) in our attempt to test for weak exogeneity. 
Testing for weak exogeneity is, in many cases, equivalent to testing for zero covariance of the 
error terms in what is considered to be the conditional and the marginal process. Charemza 
and Deadman (1992: 265) suggest that technically, testing for zero variance can be performed 
by the use of the Lagrange Multiplier test. We simply estimate the equation we think 
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represents the marginal process by OLS, compute the residuals and test these residuals as a 
missing variable in what we think is the conditional process. Since there is only one variable 
(the computed residuals) added to the regression, the traditional Student-? significance test is 
equivalent to the Lagrange Multiplier test. This way of testing for weak exogeneity was 
originally suggested by Engle (1984: 815-816). Applying the technique explained above yields 
the following results (/-Statistics in parentheses). 
Aw2 = 0.14 + 0.295Ay,_1+0.731Ap-0.001A(i?M-i?O)-0.12ecwM + 033resMargp 
(1.73) (3.14) (2.48) (-0.18) (-2.48) (0.36) 
F = 7.93 d = 2.26 adj R2 = 0.3 (9) 
Aw2 = 0.01 + 0.31 AyM + 0.92 Ap - 0.000006A(i?M - RO) -0.12ecm,_, + 0.04resM arg y 
(1.5) (3.4) (4.7) (-0.009) (-2.38) (0.49) 
F = 7.745 d = 2.298 adj R2 = 0.3 (10) 
In equation (9) the variable resMargp stands for the residuals of the marginal process10 of Ap, 
while resMargy in equation (10) refers to the marginal process of Ay . In other words we are 
checking that the parameters do not change, when we include expectational effects. It appears 
from the results in equations (9) and (10), based on the /-statistics reported below resMargp in 
equation (9) and below resMargy in equation (10), that the residuals from the marginal 
processes enter the conditional process (equation (8)) insignificantly. Hence, prices and 
income are weakly exogenous. 
10 Following Nell (2003), the marginal processes of Ap and Ay were proxied by regressing each on an intercept 
and two lags of themselves. 
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The concept of structural invariance focuses on the problem of possible variability in the 
parameters of a model generated by changes in variables. If there is no such variability in the 
model, it is said that the model is structural invariant. Testing for structural invariance and 
super exogeneity is not an easy task. Some guidance however is available. We follow 
Charemza and Deadman (1992) who suggest that, if there is a structural break in the 
conditional model, it should correspond to a structural break in the marginal model. In this 
case, the straightforward procedure is to test for structural breaks in both conditional and 
marginal processes by examining the one-step residuals (like in our figure 4.13) and to 
compare the eventual occurrences of structural breaks. If there are some structural breaks, it 
means that the parameters of the processes are not constant within the sample. If the structural 
breaks for the conditional and the marginal processes coincide in time, that is they appear for 
the same time period, it is likely that the structural break in the conditional model has been 
caused by variability in the parameters of the marginal model. If this is the case, the 
hypothesis of structural invariance (or, if weak exogeneity holds, the hypothesis of super 
exogeneity) can be rejected. In addition we do this knowing prices and income are weakly 
exogenous. 
Recall that the one-step residuals (in Figure 4.16) of what we consider as our conditional 
model (equation (8)) demonstrated that there is no structural break. To allow for comparison, 
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Figure 4.18 One-step recursive residuals for Ap 
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Figure 4.19 One-step recursive residuals for Ay 
Figure 4.18 and 4.19 display the one-step recursive residuals for the marginal processes of Ap 
and Ay, respectively. Figure 4.18 shows that the marginal process of Ap displays non-
constancies in 1990, 1994 and 1995; while Figure 4.19 shows that the marginal process of Ay 
suggests that there were non-constancies in 1990, 1994, 1995 and 2000. Based on Figure 4.18, 
we proxied the non-constancies in the marginal process of Ap by a dummy variable (Z)3) that 
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takes the value of one in 1990, 1994, and 1995 and zero otherwise, and perform the regression 
of the marginal process. We then proxied the non-constancies in the marginal process of Ay 
by a dummy (Z>4) that takes the value of one in 1990, 1994, 1995 and 2000 and zero 
otherwise, and carried out the marginal regression of the marginal process of Ay . We finally 
perform the conditional regression of equation (8) adding to it the two dummies D3 and Z)4. 
The results of these three regressions are reported below, with ^-statistics in parentheses: 
Ap = 0.008 + 0.58A/?M - 0.17A/?(_2 + 0.04£>3 
(2.46) (5.2) (-1.7) (3.86) 
adj R2=0.5 d = 2.08 (11) 
Ay = -0.007 + 0.5Av,_, - 0.1Av(_2 - 0.5£>4 
(-0.8) (4.26) (-0.9) (-2.36) 
adj R2 =0.3 d=1.95 (12) 
Am2 = 0.01 + 0.34AvM + O.SAp + 0.003A(RM - RO)-0A2ecm,_l + 0.007D3 + 0.02D4 
(1.4) (3.65) (3.82) (0.47) (-2.33) (0.3) (0.72) 
adji?2=0.3 d = 2.33 (13) 
The salient feature of the above results is that, the dummies D3 and D4, respectively are 
statistically significant in the marginal process of Ap(in equation (11)) and the marginal 
process of Ay (in equation (12)). However, on the basis of the f-statistics, both dummies D3 
and D4 are statistically insignificant in the conditional process in equation (13). Therefore, 
these observations lead us to conclude that the parameters in the conditional Aw 2 equation (8) 
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are structurally invariant to the non-constancies observed in the marginal processes and thus 
are super exogenous. It is worth mentioning that this finding is consistent with Hendry and 
Ericsson's (1991) result for the UK, MacDonald and Taylor's (1992) finding for the US, and 
Nell's (2003) result for South Africa. Therefore, the money stock in Rwanda is endogenous 
and inconsistent with the hypothesis of exogenous money determining prices through the 
money demand function. 
4.7 Conclusion and summary of the main empirical results and their policy 
implications 
We now conclude this chapter by concisely summarizing our main empirical results as well as 
their policy implications. In this study our first hypothesis (Chapter One, page five) is that, 
despite the implementation of the IMF and World Bank's suggested reforms, the money 
demand function in Rwanda is stable. The analysis in this chapter provides empirical evidence 
of a constant and structurally stable M2 money demand in Rwanda. On the basis of all the 
tests performed, namely, the recursive least squares coefficients, the one-step recursive 
residuals, and the scaled recursive Chow test; all these visual displays strongly suggest that 
M2 money demand in Rwanda is stable. In fact, the recursive least squares' estimates of our 
error correction model remained stable over our period of study; all the one-step recursive 
residuals lie within two estimated standard deviations from their mean (the error bands of 
+ 2at), also suggesting that our model has not undergone any structural changes over the 
sample period; and all the values of the scaled recursive Chow test lie under unity implying 
that the null hypothesis of no structural change is accepted at the 5 per cent level of 
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significance. The non-constancies observed in the marginal processes were modeled with 
dummies and enter statistically insignificantly the conditional process, leading us to conclude 
that the parameters in the conditional model are structurally invariant with respect to these 
non-constancies. 
Prices and income were found to be super exogenous. Recall that a variable is said to be super 
exogenous for the parameters of interest if it is weakly exogenous for the parameters of 
interest, and also invariant to changes in the parameters of the marginal model (Hendry, 1995). 
Super exogeneity is the crucial concept for policy purposes and links to the Lucas critique. 
Lucas (1976) questions the appropriateness of using econometric models for policy simulation 
experiments by arguing that the structure of model can be altered by the impact of 
expectations concerning the policy. In our investigation of super exogeneity we found that 
prices and income were weakly exogenous and the parameters of our conditional model were 
invariant to changes in the parameters of the marginal process leading to the conclusion that 
prices and income are super exogenous. Therefore, despite empirical evidence of a constant 
and structurally stable M2 money demand function, our results suggest that M2 money 
provides little information about future price changes in Rwanda and may not be a reliable 
indicator for changes in monetary policy. This means that our second hypothesis in this thesis 
(Chapter One, page five) that changes in M2 determines changes in prices is rejected. 
Therefore, the money stock is endogenous and prices influence money through the stable 
money demand function (Nell, 2003). Since prices are super exogenous to money, the 
conditional money demand equation cannot be inverted to determine prices (Hendry, 1995). 
Money does not determine prices. This result confirms the wisdom of the central bank to opt 
for a policy of inflation targeting, as prices determine money. 
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Other results that are worth noting are that, m2 deflated by consumer prices (m2 - p) is 1(1), 
suggesting that M2 money demand function may not be homogeneous of degree one in the 
level of prices. In other words price changes are greater than money demand changes, 
indicating that money is not supemeutral. The coefficient (equal to 0.12) of the equilibrium 
error term in our error correction model is statistically significantly different from zero 
implying that 0.12 of the discrepancy between money demand, income, and price in the 
previous quarter is eliminated in the following quarter. Therefore, the speed of adjustment for 
money demand in Rwanda is equal to 0.12, which is considered to be low, indicating the slow 
adjustment of the amount of money demanded toward its long-run equilibrium value, 
suggesting that the Rwandan money market adjusts back to equilibrium, after a shock, in about 
two years for our sample. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
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CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
This thesis concerns itself with the stability of money demand in Rwanda. In Chapter One we 
point out that the thesis sets out to examine money demand theory, provides a brief history of 
monetary developments in Rwanda and for the first time estimates a money demand function 
for Rwanda. Chapters Two to Four did exactly this. However, to provide some context to the 
thesis we wanted to draw out the monetary policy implications based on the research, given 
that the Rwandan central bank had recently changed to a policy of inflation targeting. 
5.2 Research hypotheses 
In Chapter One we state that the thesis hopes to provide an answer to what we feel are the two 
most fundamental research questions in Rwanda as regards monetary policy considerations. 
These research questions are: 
(i) Is there a stable money demand function in Rwanda, so that a monetary aggregate 
targeting can continue to play a role in macro economy? 
(ii) Does money determine prices? 
These two questions yield the following hypotheses: 
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(i) The demand for money function in Rwanda is stable. 
(ii) Causality runs from money to prices. 
For monetary aggregate targeting to be a coherent policy, we must confirm both these 
hypotheses. 
5.3 Conclusion and future research 
After giving a theoretical overview of monetary theory in Chapter Two in order to provide 
support for our estimated equation we covered some of the more recent developments in 
monetary policy in Rwanda in Chapter Three. Chapter Four is where we examine the validity 
of both our research hypotheses. This original empirical chapter shows that the answer to our 
first question is yes and there is a structurally stable M2 money demand relationship in 
Rwanda. All three of our tests confirm stability. Chapter Four also shows that prices are 
exogenous and that the answer to our second research hypothesis is no and if prices are not 
determined by money, then the inflation rate can be targeted. The finding that our second 
hypothesis is not validated suggests that inflation targeting may be best strategy for the central 
bank of Rwanda to follow. But having said that we must point out the limitations of our study. 
Our specification of money demand does not incorporate exchange rate considerations, and 
nor does it have a satisfactory variable for interest rate changes. In addition income should be 
measured as permanent income. There is no guarantee that real GDP measures permanent 
income. So before we can conclude with certainty that inflation targeting in Rwanda is based 
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APPENDIX ONE: Selected Rwanda's Economic and Financial Indicators 1995-2004 
(Soucre: Rwandan Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning) 
Table 3. Rwanda: Selected Econrjrric and Financial Indicators, 1995-2004 
Output and prices 
Real GDP growfo 
GDP deflator 
Consumer prices (period average) 
Consumer prices (end of period) 
External sector 
Export, Cob (in U S dollars) 
Imports, f.o.b(inUS. dollars) 
Government finance 
Revenue 
Total expenditure and net lending 
Current expenditure 
Money and credit 1/ 
Domestic credit 113/ 
Money and quasi money (M2) 
Reserve money 
Velocity (ratio of GDP to M2; end of period) 
Interest rate (one-year savings deposits, in percent end of period) 
Govemmait finance 
Total revenue 
Total expenditure and net lending 
Capital expenditure 
Current expenditure 
Primary fiscal balance 4/ 
Augmented current balance 5/ 



























































































































































































































































External current account balance 
Including official transfers 
Excluding official transfers 
External debt (end of period) 6/ 
Gross reserves (in months of imports of G&5)) 
Memorandum items: 
Nominal GEP (in billions of Rwanda francs) 1/ 
































































Sources: RAvardese authorities; and staff estimates arri projections. 
1/ All numbers are based on current exchange rates. 
2/ Asarxnxntoftherjegirniirg<)f-periodstcdccfbraadmo 
3/ The 2001 rates of growth assume that the excess external budgetary support at end-2000 would be used in its entirety to finance additional social expenditure 
during 2001, 
4/ Revenue excluding grants; minus current expendilure except interest due and except exceptional social expenditure 
5/ Revenue excluding grants; minus current expendilure (excluding external interest), domestically-financed capital expenditure and net lending 
6/ After rescheduling. On a disbursed basis, including arrears, reschecMing and riew debt 
II On a postHIPC basis and based on assumptions about expected rebor rowing HTPC assistance is assumed to be c^ivered unconditionally as of 1999. The experts ctaxmnator is cali^aled using a t ^ ^ 
8/ Financing gap after taking into accc^icbitifiedfinancirg expected durir^tte 
7295763 82.7587 9243243 98.75694 96.24562 100 103.3655 105.432825 110,177302 113 482621 116.8871 
B 
APPENDIX TWO: Poverty monitoring indicators in Rwanda 
Item 
Health/Nutrition 
Infant Mortality Rate/1000 
> Vaccination/100 
> Malnutrition<5ans 
Maternal Mortality Ratio/100,000 
> Births attended by qualified personnel 
> Rate of contraceptive use 
> Rate of antenatal care 
HIV/AIDS Incidence rate 
> Use of condom 
> Rate of STD's cases 
Malaria 
> Use of mosquito nets 
> Malaria new cases/100.000 
Rate of use of health services 
> Distance to health centre 
> Population /doctor 
> Population/Nurse 
> Access to mutuelles 
Quality of health services 
> Annual rate of consultation/population 





Level of instruction of the population 
Primary schools 
Gross Enrolment rate 
Girls 
Boys 






Transition rate from primary to secondary 



































































































































Gross Enrolment rate 
Female 
Male 
Ratio students/ qualified teacher 
Ratio students/ teacher 
Income/Consumption Poverty 
Poverty incidence rate 
Unemployment rate 
Agricultural and productivity 
Maize 
• Production (tons) 
• Acreage (ha) 
• Productivity per ha 
• Average market price 
Rice 
• Production (tons) 
• Acreage (ha) 
• Productivity per ha 
• Average market price 
Soya 
• Production (tons) 
• Acreage (ha) 
• Productivity per ha 
• Average market price 
Beans 
• Production (tons) 
• Acreage (ha) 
• Productivity per ha 
• Average market price 
Irish potatoes 
• Production (tons) 
• Acreage (ha) 
• Productivity per ha 
• Average market price 
Coffee 
• Production (tons) 
• Acreage (ha) 
• Productivity per ha 
• Average market price 
Tea 
• Production (tons) 
• Acreage (ha) 
• Productivity per ha 
• Average market price 
Imported fertiliser volume( tons) 
Meat (tons) 
• Average market price per kilo 
Milk (tons) 
• Average market price per litter 
Eggs(tons) 
• Average market price per unit 
Insemination artificial (cattle) 
Food aid needs forecast 






















































































































































Poultry and rabbits 
Housing and settlements 
Population with Access to Safe Water 
Population with Access to hygienic facilities 
Employment/Wages 
Wage Rate of Casual Labor (On-Farm) 
Active population 
Public Expenditure Data (Health and Education) 
Health % of Total Gov Expenditure 
% X budget 
Education % of GDP 



























Source: Rwandan Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: National Bank of Rwanda (Department of statistics) 
